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ffective July 1, 2000, California's regulation of the
and other health care professionals, con
sumer service representatives, and sup
managed care industry was transferred from the De
partment of Corporations (DOC) to the Department
port staff assist the DMHC Director in
of Managed Health Care (DMHC), a new agency within the
licensing and regulating more than 100
cabinet-level Business, Transportation and Housing Agency
health plans in California. Licensed health plans include
(BTH). The creation of DMHC resulted from Governor Gray
HMOs and other full-service health plans, as well as several
Davis' approval of AB 78 (Gallegos) (Chapter 525, Statutes
categories of specialized health plans (including prepaid denof 1999), one component of a 21tal, vision, mental health, chiro
bill package signed by the Gover
practic, and pharmacy plans).
Effective July 1, 2000, California's regulation of the
nor in 1999 to reform the regula
HMOs and other full-service
managed care industry was transferred from the
tion of managed care in the state.
health plans provide health care
Department of Corporations to the Department of
[17:1 CRLR 7-9, 12-16]The De
services to approximately 23.5
Managed Health Care, a new agency within the cabinet
partment is created in Health and
million California enrollees. Spe
level Business, Transportation and Housing Agency.
Safety Code section 134 l ;
cialized health plans arrange for
DMHC's regulations are codified
specialized services for nearly 35
in Title 28 of the California Code of Regulations (CCR).
million California enrollees. Total enrollment in all health
plans exceeded 58 million as of May 1999.
DMHC administers the Knox-Keene Health Care Ser
vice Plan Act of 1975, Health and Safety Code section 1340
AB 78 (Gallegos) creates several advisory committees
et seq., which is intended to promote the delivery of health
which hold public meetings and hearings to provide a fo
and medical care to Californians who enroll in or subscribe
rum for public access and grievance, and which assist the
DMHC Director. Under Health and Safety Code section
to services provided by a health care service plan. A "health
care service plan" (health plan)-more commonly known as
1347, the 22-member Advisory Committee on Managed
a health maintenance organization (HMO) or managed care
Health Care (ACMHC) advises the Director on various is
organization (MCO)-is defined broadly as any person who
sues and produces an Internet-accessible annual report that
undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care ser
contains recommendations made to the Director by the
ACMHC.
vices to subscribers or enrollees, or to pay for or reimburse
any part of the cost for those services, in return for a prepaid
A second advisory committee, the five-member Clinical
or periodic charge paid by or on behalf of the subscribers or
Advisory Panel (CAP) established in Health and Safety Code
enrollees. In Health and Safety Code section 1342, the legis
section 1347.l , provides expert assistance to the Director in
lature has expressly instructed the Department Director to
ensuring that the Department's independent medical review
ensure the continued role of the professional as the deter
(IMR) system meets quality standards necessary to protect
miner of the patient's health needs; ensure that subscribers
the public interest. Created in Health and Safety Code sec
and enrollees are educated and informed of the benefits and
tion 1374.30 et seq., the IMR system-effective January l,
services available in order to make a rational consumer choice
2001-allows health plan enrollees to seek an independent
in the marketplace; prosecute malefactors who make fraudu
review when medical services are denied, delayed, or other
lent solicitations or who use misrepresentations or other de
wise limited by a plan or one of its contracting providers,
based on a finding that the service is not medically necessary
ceptive methods or practices; help to ensure the best possible
or appropriate. The independent reviews are conducted by
health care for the public at the lowest possible cost by trans
expert medical organizations independent of plans and certi
ferring the financial risk of health care from patients to pro
fied by an accrediting organization, pursuant to conflict of
viders; promote effective representation of the interests of
subscribers and enrollees; ensure the financial stability of
interest provisions. An IMR determination is binding on the
health plans by means of proper regulatory procedures; en
plan, and the Department will enforce it. CAP is responsible
sure that subscribers and enrollees receive available and ac
for reviewing IMR decisions and making recommendations
cessible health and medical services rendered in a manner
for improvement of the IMR process.
providing continuity of health care; and ensure that subscrib
SB 260 (Speier) (Chapter 529, Statutes of 1999) added
ers and enrollees have their grievances expeditiously and thor
section 1347.15 to the Health and Safety Code. Section
oughly reviewed by DMHC.
1347.15 creates a third advisory committee, the Financial
The Director of DMHC is appointed by, and serves at
Solvency Standards Board (FSSB), to advise the DMHC Di
the pleasure of, the Governor. The Department's staff of at
rector on matters of financial solvency affecting the delivery
torneys, financial examiners, health plan analysts, physicians
of health care services. Comprised of the DMHC Director
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and seven members appointed by the Director, FSSB is diof Amigos Volunteers in Edu
·
has served as executive drrector
rected to develop and recommend to the Director financial
cation and Services, a community-based nonprofit organiza
tion in Texas that provides health care services for the
solvency requirements and standards relating to plan operaunderserved and at-risk populations in a 13-county area. In
tions and transactions, and to periodically monitor and report
that capacity, she designed and implemented one of the most
on the implementation and results of those requirements and
standards.
innovative outreach programs in Texas and increased access
to medical care for underserved communities.
AB 78 (Gallegos) also enacted the Gallegos-Rosenthal
Patient Advocate Program, and ad ded section 1368.02(c) to
the Health and Safety Code, which creates the Office of the
MAJOR PROJ
Patient Advocate (OPA). Section 1368.02(c) requires the PaDMHC Releases Ernergency Financial
tient Advocate-who is appointed by the Governor upon recSolvency Regulations
ommendation of the BTH Secretary and is technically indeDMHC's Financial Solvency Standards Board was ere
pendent from DMHC-to "represent the interests of enrollated in SB 260 (Speier) ( Chapter 529, Statutes of 1999) to
ees served by health care service pJans regulated by the defocus on a pressing prob)em affecting health care in Califor
partment. The goal of the office shall be to help enrollees
nia-the increasing number of medical groups, medical cor
secure health care services to which they are entitled under
porations, independent physician associations (IPAs), and
the laws administered by the department." OPA is required to
other "middlemen" that assume financial risk for the medical
help health plan enrollees obtain information about grievance
care of a health plan's enrollees (also called "risk-bearing
procedures, resolve consumer complaints, compile an annual
organizations" or "RBOs") that are declaring bankruptcy, leav
HMO quality-of-care report card, and issue an annual report
ing physicians unpaid for medical services already rendered
on the activities of the OPA.
and patients stranded and forced to change physicians. Ac
DMHC houses the HMO Help Center, which is open 24
cording to the California Medical Association (CMA), the
hours a day, 365 days a year, and functions in 150 languages
problem is very serious: A 1999 study commissioned by CMA
to help consumers with HMO prob!ems. The Help Center is
found that 113 medical groups had
staffed with 100 HMO rights ex
gone out of business during the
perts and customer services rep
is open 24 prior three years, another 34
resentatives. The OPA monitors DMHC houses the HMO Help Center, which
in 150 would go bankrupt within a year,
functions
and
year,
a
days
365
day,
a
hours
the Help Center and helps iden
problems.
HMO
with
consumers
help
to
languages
and 70% of the remaining medi
tify systemic consumer problems
cal groups are in "serious finanbeing reported to the Help Center
cial trouble." [17:1 CRLR 11J
as well as throughout the state so the Department can act
In California, the problem has manifested itself to the
quickly and efficiently. The OPA also makes sure the Center
detriment of patients and physicians for several years. FPA
provides the highest levels of quality and service.
Medical Management went bank
DMHC also houses the Office
rupt in 1998, leaving (according
of Plan and Provider Relations
(OPPR), which is designed to From the physician's point of view, the problem stems to CMA) 1,600 physicians unpaid
open the lines of communication from unmanageably low capitation rates, lack of for $60 million in services ren
between the Department and information, and inequality in the contract negotiation dered. [ 16:1 CRLR 29) In March
1999, DOC seized MedPartners
health plans, hospitals, physicians, process with HMOs.
Provider Network and placed it in
and other providers to assure early
bankruptcy under the jurisdiction of a conservator-tempo
intervention for the resolution of consumer issues.
rarily stranding 1,000 physicians and 1.3 million Californians.
Finally, more than 300 employees at the Department
[16:2 CRLR 7-8] Just two months after receiving a $30 mil
(based in Sacramento and Los AngeJes) work on seven teams:
lion bailout loan from eight HMOs to help it pay its creditors
Consumer Resources and Support, Enforcement, Technology
(mostly physicians), Anaheim-based KPC Medical Manage
and Innovation, Legal Services, Oversight Standards and
ment filed for bankruptcy in November 2000, disrupting care
Research, Health Plan Oversight, a nd Staff Leadership.
for 300,000 patients. And those are just the largest failures.
Governor Davis has appointed Daniel Zingale as the first
EI Dorado Medical Associates and the San Mateo Individual
Director of DMHC. From 1997-99 , Zingale served as execuPractice Association folded in September 2000; the Family
tive director of Washington, D.C.-based AIDS Action; beHealth Care Medical Group, serving 135,000 patients in
fore that, he was public policy director of the Human Rights
Ventura County, closed its doors in October 2000; and other
Campaign, the nation's largest gay and lesbian civil and husmaller medical groups have closed or moved in recent
man rights organization. From 1987-91, Zingale was a deputy
months.
controller and chief of staff to then-Controller Gray Davis.
♦ The Problem. From the physician's point of view, the
In July 2000, Governor Davis appointed Angela Mora as
problem stems from unmanageably low capitation rates, lack
the Patient Advocate for DMHC and BTH. Since 1991, Mora

ECTS
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of information, and inequality in the contract negotiation pro
cess with HMOs. CMA states that five health plans control at
least 75% of California's managed care market, so physicians
and physician groups-in order to practice medicine-are
forced to accept whatever capitation rates and other terms
those plans dictate. Further, physicians say plans are not forth
coming with information about the enrollees for whose care
the physician groups are assuming responsibility. When phy
sician groups strapped by low capitation rates and high-cost
patient populations get into financial trouble, the incentives
to delay or deny care to patients are momentous, and quality
of care suffers.
For their part, health plans dispute the physicians' alle
gations of widespread market concentration by a few HMOs
and unequal bargaining power in the negotiation process.
Plans emphasize their legal duties to delegate the care of their
enrollees only to RBOs that are able to bear the risk, and to
monitor the continuing solvency and stability of those with
whom they contract. To satisfy these legal duties (and pre
clude potential civil liability and DMHC disciplinary action),
plans claim they need detailed information about the books
and financial solvency of the RBOs with whom they con
tract, both during contract negotiations and throughout the
term of the contract. Plans insist that they themselves should
be able to verify the solvency of those with whom they con
tract, to protect themselves and their enrollees.
The state-caught in the middle and paying dearly through
public health care programs when the private sector fails
must navigate in an area where it has no express jurisdiction:
Medical groups and other RBOs are not licensed or regulated
in any way (yet). Further, the HMO-medical group contractual
negotiation is a private transaction into which the state is not
generally authorized to interfere, and it sometimes involves
proprietary information (or at least information that the parties
to the negotiation would like to keep confidential).
♦ The Statute. To attempt a resolution of this thorny
problem, SB 260 (Speier) created the FSSB and a regulatory
framework that is intended to ensure the fiscal solvency of
medical groups and other RBOs. In this regard, the bill added
new section 1375.4 to the Health and Safety Code, which
requires contracts between health plans and RBOs after July
1, 2000 to include: (1) a requirement that the RBO furnish
financial information to the health plan "and meet any other
financial requirements that assist the health ... plan in main
taining the financial viability of its arrangements for the pro
vision of health care services in a manner that does not ad
versely affect the integrity of the contract negotiation pro
cess"; (2) a requirement that the health plan disclose infor
mation to the RBO that enables the RBO to be informed re
garding the financial risk assumed under the contract; and
(3) a requirement that health plans provide payments of all
risk arrangements, excluding capitation, within 180 days af
ter close of the fiscal year.
SB 260 also required the DMHC Director to adopt regu
lations (as recommended by FSSB) in the following areas on
30

or before June 30, 2000 (a deadline which became impos
sible to meet as DMHC was not created until July 1, 2000):
• Under Health and Safety Code section 1375.4(b)(l )(A),
the regulations must establish a process for the review or
"grading" of an RBO based on four specified criteria: (I) the
extent to which it reimburses, contests, or denies claims for
health care services for which it is financially responsible in
accordance with the timeframes and other requirements in
Health and Safety Code section 1371 and in accordance with
any other applicable state and federal laws and regulations;
(2) the extent to which it properly estimates its liability for
"incurred but not reported" (IBNR) claims (that is, sums it
owes to doctors who have not yet filed their claim), records
that estimate at least quarterly as an accrual in its books and
records, and appropriately reflects this accrual in its financial
statements; (3) the extent to which it maintains "at all times a
positive tangible net equity" (TNE) as defined in section
1300.76(e), Title 28 of the CCR; and (4) the extent to which
it maintains "at all times a positive level of working capital
(excess of current assets over current liabilities)."
• The review or grading process must be based upon in
formation provided by the RBO- including balance sheets,
claims reports, and designated annual, quarterly, or monthly
financial statements prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP)-"to a single exter
nal party as approved by the director to the extent that it does
not adversely affect the integrity of the contract negotiation
process between the health care service plan and the
risk-bearing organizations."
• Audits of the financial statements of an RBO must be
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS) and in a manner that avoids duplication of
review of the RBO.
• The regulations must establish a process for corrective
action plans (CAPs)-which must be "mutually agreed upon"
by the health plan and the RBO and approved by the DMHC
Director-for cases where the review or grading indicates
deficiencies that need to be corrected by the RBO, and must
set forth contingency plans to ensure the delivery of health
care services if the CAP fails.
• The regulations must require health plans to disclose
specified information to the RBO that enables the RBO to be
informed regarding the risk assumed under the contract.
• Health plans must provide periodic reports to the Di
rector that include information concerning the RBOs and the
type and amount of financial risk assumed by them. Further,
"if deemed necessary and appropriate by the Director,"
DMHC must create a registration process for RBOs.
• The regulations must ensure the confidentiality of fi
nancial and other records to be produced, disclosed, or other
wise made available, "unless as otherwise determined by the
Director."
♦ DOC's Draft Regulations. In May 2000, before DMHC
was officially created, DOC released draft regulations in re
sponse to the mandate in SB 260. Characterized as a "start-
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ing point" intended to stimulate comments by interested par
tions for CAPs upon request of the external party; meet with
and advise the external party regarding the recommended cor
ties, the draft regulations attempted to accomplish seven goals:
rective action; permit the external party to prepare a CAP,
• Plan Disclosures to RBOs. In every contract with an
taking into account the recommendations of the plan and the
RBO, a plan must agree to provide the RBO with detailed
RBO; resolve any disputes concerning the CAP pursuant to a
information on enrollees, the risk-sharing arrangement be
tween the plan and the RBO, and the amount of payment for
resolution mechanism established by the external party; and
each and every service to be provided under the contract.
submit the CAP to the DMHC Director for approval. Plans
• Minimum Standards for RBOs. In every contract with a
and RBOs must also agree to adhere to any contingency plan
plan, an RBO must agree to: (I) reimburse, contest, or deny
for the continuous delivery of health care services to the plan's
enrollees, if the CAP fails.
every claim for health care services it has provided, arranged
• Periodic Reportsfrom Plans. Plans are required to sub
for, or for which it is otherwise financially responsible within
mit a report to the DMHC Director, not more than 45 days
the timeframes established in Health and Safety Code sec
after the close of each quarter, containing a list of all its con
tions 1371 and 1371.35; (2) estimate its liability for IBNR
tracting RBOs and describing in detail all of their risk-shar
claims on a monthly basis pursuant to one of two specified
ing arrangements.
methods; (3) maintain at all times a positive TNE of at least
• Disciplinary Action for Plans. A plan that complies with
$50,000; and (4) maintain at all times a positive level of work
all of the provisions of these regulations shall be deemed to
ing capital of at least $25,000 in excess of current liabilities.
have satisfied its obligations under section
• RBO Information and Audits. In every contract with a
1300.70(b)(2)(H)( l ), Title 28 of the CCR, to ensure that the
plan, an RBO must agree to prepare quarterly reports con
taining specified financial information and (on an annual ba
RBO has the financial capacity to meet its contractual obli
gations. Any failure of the plan to comply with the require
sis) undergo a certified financial audit containing specified
ments of Health and Safety Code section 1375.4 and any of
financial information. These reports must be submitted to "an
these regulations is grounds for disciplinary action by the
external party." In addition, the RBO must agree to notify the
external party immediately if it repeatedly fails to reimburse,
DMHC Director.
♦ Reaction to Draft Regulations. At its first meeting on
contest or deny claims, fails to estimate or document IBNR
claims, or fails to maintain the required TNE and working
August 21, 2000, FSSB discussed DOC's draft regulations
capital levels; permit the external party to "make any exami
and the many written comments it had received thereon. FSSB
also took considerable public comment on DOC's draft regu
nation it deems necessary" to determine whether the RBO is
lations. Many witnesses questioned the concept of the "ex
satisfying the rules; and allow the plan to terminate the con
ternal party" and the complete absence of any information in
tract if the RBO fails to provide the required reports or no
the draft regulations on the "external party" to whom much
tices to the external party.
of what appears to be the Department's regulatory obligation
• Review of an RBO's Performance. In every contract
is being transferred (for example, how the "external party"
with a plan, an RBO must agree to allow the external party to
review or grade it; prepare periodic reports describing the
should be selected, by whom, how it should be staffed, its
RBO's overall performance in
required qualifications, whether
meeting the required criteria; Many witnesses questioned the concept of the and how it will be overseen by
maintain a public file of reports "external party" and the complete absence of any DMHC, and how to insulate it
and nonproprietary information information in the draft regulations on the "external from conflicts of interest).
concerning the RBO and make party" to whom much of what appears to be the
In addition, physician groups
that file available to plans, other Department's regulatory obligation is being transferred. complained about the TNE/work
RBOs, DMHC, and other inter
ing capital levels and argued that
ested parties; and allow a plan to
most groups would not be able to
terminate the contract if the RBO fails to comply with the
meet those standards "at all times" (as is required by the stat
evaluation process. A plan that contracts with an RBO must
ute) and that many small IPAs will not be able to meet those
review any reports and nonproprietary information made
standards at all. Health plans were unhappy because the regu
available by the external party to determine whether the RBO
lations are not specific in identifying the circumstances un
der which a CAP must be initiated and because they do not
is meeting the regulatory criteria, and must notify the exter
nal party immediately if any of its RBOs repeatedly fails to
provide plans with unfettered access to the books of RBOs;
reimburse, contest or deny claims, fails to estimate or docu
the plans argued that because DMHC's periodic "public re
ment IBNR claims, or fails to maintain the required TNE and
ports" on health plans are public information, financial infor
working capital levels.
mation needed by plans to determine RBO solvency should
• Corrective Action Plans for RBOs. In every contract, a
also be public information (or at least available to plans). Plans
plan and an RBO must agree to comply with a process ad
also argued that the regulations are overbroad because they
ministered by the external party for corrective action plans.
apply to "every contract" between a plan and an RBO, when
The plan and the RBO must agree to propose recommendasome contracts do not shift all financial risk to an RBO. ConCalifornia Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) ♦ covers November 1999-April 2001
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that the RBO is solvent, that determination will be reported
sumer groups noted that the draft regulations deal exclusively
to the plan and that is it. If the RBO meets the solvency stan
lvency,
and
suggested
that
with financial indicators of fiscal so
dards,
plans would not have access to the financial informa
ted
as
well
(for
example,
non-financial indicators be evalua
tion
submitted
to the third party (outside quarterly statements,
number of complaints and grievances filed due to delays in
which are already public inforrnation)." The plan representa
scheduling physician visits, delays in referrals to specialists,
tives argued that this process may not be adequate to allow
a decrease in the number of referrals to specialists, reducthem to fulfill their legal duties, and argued that their exist
tions in referrals outside the physician group, narrower or
ing duty to monitor RB Os' solvency on an ongoing basis
restricted criteria for second opinions, and a decrease in the
"should go away if we have an external party or evaluator
number of treatments for which the RBO is at financial risk).
upon whom we must rely for solvency information."
The Board decided to split up into three subcommittees which
When asked why DMHC was not delegated the role of
could focus specifically on particuJar areas of the required
the "external party," Sena tor Speier stated: "At that time, we
regulations: ( l ) Definitions and 0 rganization Criteria; (2)
dido ' t know what the Department or its staffing would look
Risk-Sharing and Organization Iniormation; and (3) Organilike. If there is consensus that the Department can and should
zation Evaluation, Corrective Action, and Plan Reporting.
fill that role, that could be the subject of legislation next year."
Senator Jackie Speier, the author of SB 260, attended
During subsequent testimony, representatives of consumer
FSSB's September 2000 meeting to present her insights into
groups argued that DMHC should be properly resourced and
the Board's role, the requirements of SB 260, and the draft
authorized to perform the role of the external party, express
regulations. She noted that while other bills in the 1999 maning strong support for the insertion of a government agency
aged care package had received more media attention, "in
the grand scheme of things AB 78
into the review process (instead
and SB 260 are the most impor
of a private entity controlled by
tant in getting at the underlying Senator Jackie Speier, the author of SB 260, attended health plans that sets standards in
problem, which is needed if this FSSB's September 2000 meeting to present her insights private).
deeply troubled health care model into the Board's role, the requirements of SB 260, and
Over the course of the next
is to survive." She explained that the draft regulations.
several months, FSSB and its
SB 260 was originally conceived
three subcommittees convened
monthly meetings to work on the language of the proposed
as an "early warning system" to alert DMHC to medical
solvency regulations. At each monthly hearing, the Board ac
groups that may be "in disorder." Senator Speier also said
that, at one time, she was going to insert into the bill what
cepted public comment on the emerging draft. By December
FSSB is being asked to adopt in regulations-"but we were
2000, the Board had decided to recommend that DMHC (or
discouraged from doing so, because these standards will need
its designated agent) serve as the "external party" described
to be reevaluated and changed
in SB 260, and to amend the draft
from time to time." She stated that
regulations accordingly. With in
By December 2000, the Board had decided to
the bill was "hammered out over
put from representatives of plans,
recommend that DMHC (or its desig nated agent) serve
many months and was intended to
medical groups, and patient advo
as the "external party" described in SB 260, and to
be balanced-to give plans confi
cates, FSSB also debated numer
amend the draft regulations accordingly.
dence that RBOs can provide ser
ous other issues, finalized the lan
guage of its financial solvency
vices, and to give RBOs informa
tion and a promise that they will be paid on time."
regulations at its meeting on January 9, 2001, and formally
Also at the September 2000 meeting, three panels conrecommended them to DMHC Director Daniel Zingale. The
vened to provide FSSB members with feedback on DOC's
Director approved them on January 29; BTH approved them
on March 9; and the Office of Administrative Law (OAL)
draft regulations from three primary stakeholder groups: plans,
providers, and patients. A panel of plan representatives testiapproved them as emergency regulations on March 22, 2001.
fied first, and they stressed their need for access to detailed
♦ The Emergency Regulations. Following is a summary
financial information (including cash flow information, which
ofDMHC's March 2001 emergency financial solvency regu
is not addressed in the draft regulations) and nonfinancial inlations adopted pursuant to SB 260 (Speier):
formation which may be indicative of an impending solvency
• Section 1300.75.4- Definitions. Section 1300.75.4 de
problem at an RBO throughout the term of the contract so as
fines several terms used in SB 260, including "external party,"
to be able to fulfill their statutory duties. Plan representatives
"organization," "risk arrangement," and "lawfully organized
also expressed confusion about the role and authority of the
group of physicians." The term "external party" means DMHC
"external party." Senator Speier interjected her view of the
"or its designated agent, which may be an outside entity or
legislative intent behind the inclusion of the "external party"
person contracted or appointed to fulfill the functions stated
in SB 260. According to the Senator, "the third party will
in these regulations." In response to public comment, FSSB
evaluate proprietary information submitted by the RBO in
also defined the term "risk arrangement" to include both "risk
order to evaluate the RBO's solvency. If the third party finds
sharing arrangements" and "risk-shifting arrangements"; in
32

California Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) ♦ covers November 1999-April 2001

"""

HEALTH CARE REGULATORY AGENCIES
limited areas, the regulations treat risk-sharing arrangements
differently from risk-shifting arrangements.
• Section 1300.75.4.1-Risk Arrangement Disclosure.
This section describes the detailed information that plans must
provide RBOs (and the method and frequency in which that
information must be disclosed) on enrollees who are being
assigned to the RBO, to enable the RBO to evaluate the risks
associated with delivering health care services to their as
signed group of enrollees. The section also requires plans to
disclose to RBOs the following information for each. type of
risk arrangement (Medicare+Choice, Medi-Cal, traditional
commercial, point of service, small group, and individual
plans) under the contract: (1) a matrix of responsibility for
medical expenses which will be allocated to the RBO, facil
ity, or plan under the risk arrangement; (2) projected utiliza
tion rates and unit costs for each major expense service group
(inpatient, outpatient, primary care physician, specialist, phar
macy, home health, durable medical equipment, ambulance,
and other), the source of the data, and the actuarial methods
employed in determining the utilization rates and unit costs
by benefit plan type for the type of risk arrangement; and (3)
all factors used to adjust payments or risk-sharing targets,
including but not limited to age, sex, localized geographic
area, family size, experience rated, and benefit plan design,
including copayment/deductible levels.
This section also requires plans to disclose to RBOs, on
a quarterly basis beginning with the first quarter of 2001, a
detailed description of each and every amount (including ex
penses and income) allocated to the RBO and to the plan un
der each and every risk-sharing arrangement. The regulation
requires payment by plans on all risk arrangements (exclud
ing capitation) within I 80 days after the close of the RBO's
contract year or the contract termination date (whichever oc
curs first). For risk-sharing arrangements, the regulation re
quires plans to disclose the amount of payment for each and
every service to be provided under the contract, including
any fee schedules or other factors or units used in determin
ing the fees for each and every service; for risk-shifting ar
rangements, the plan must disclose, in the case of capitated
payment, the amount to be paid per enrollee per month.
• Section 1300.75.4.2-Organization Information. This
section describes the disclosure and performance requirements
for RBOs (and eliminates the minimum $50,000 TNE require
ment and the required working capital level of $25,000 in
excess of current liabilities contained in DOC's draft regula
tions). For each quarter beginning on or after January I , 200 I ,
an RBO must submit to DMHC a quarterly report containing
all of the following: ( I ) financial statements (including at least
a balance sheet, an income statement, and a statement of cash
flows) for the immediately preceding quarter prepared in ac
cordance with GAAP; (2) a statement as to what percentage
of claims have been reimbursed, contested, or denied during
that quarter by the RBO within 45 working days, and in ac
cordance with Health and Safety Code section 137 1; if less
than 95% of all claims have been reimbursed, contested, or

denied on a timely basis, the statement shall be accompanied
by a report describing the reason why the claims-paying pro
cess is not meeting the requirements of applicable law; (3) a
statement as to whether or not the RBO has estimated and
documented on a monthly basis IBNR claims, pursuant to
section 1 300.77 .2, Title 1 6 of the CCR; if not, the RBO must
submit a detailed report describing the nature of the deficiency,
reasons for the deficiency, actions taken to correct any defi
ciency, and the results of that action; and (4) a statement as to
whether or not the RBO has at all times maintained both a
positive TNE and positive working capital; if not, the RBO
must include a detailed report describing the nature of the
deficiency, reasons for the deficiency, actions taken to cor
rect any deficiency, and the results of that action. Section
1300.75.4.2 also requires a principal officer of the RBO to
attach a written verification that the information described
above and submitted to DMHC is true and correct.
Section 1300.75.4.2 also requires certified financial au
dits of RBOs on an annual basis. Subsection (b)(2) allows a
one-time limited exception for small RBOs which served
fewer than 10,000 lives on December 1 , 2000. Under this
one-time exception, a small RBO may submit reviewed fi
nancial statements prepared by a certified public accountant
for the fiscal year starting in 2000; after that, all RBOs
regardless of size-must submit annual certified audits of their
books.
Section 1300.75.4.2 also requires each RBO to submit
detailed information to the Department on an annual basis, to
enable DMHC to engage in meaningful review of an RBO's
compliance with the four criteria in Health and Safety Code
section 1 375.4(b)( l )(A) (see above). At this point, the De
partment has opted not to implement the registration process
for RBOs (which is authorized in SB 260), preferring instead
to collect information. Finally, this regulation requires an RBO
to notify DMHC within five business days of discovering that
it "has experienced any event which materially alters its fi
nancial situation or threatens its solvency," and permits
DMHC to make any examination of an RBO that it deems
reasonable and necessary to implement and enforce the Health
and Safety Code.
• Section 1300.75.4.3-Plan Reporting. This section re
quires plans to submit to DMHC quarterly reports including
detailed information on all contracting RBOs. Additionally,
plans must submit to DMHC, on an annual basis, a separate
matrix for each product line (commercial, Medicare+Choice,
and Medi-Cal) showing the allocation of risk among the plan,
each RBO, and the facility by major expense category. This
report must disclose, for each product line, the number of
lives covered by each contracted RBO. The regulation also
requires a plan to disclose whether it provides stop-loss in
surance to the RBO and, if so, the nature of any and all stop
loss arrangements. Each such report or matrix must include a
written verification that the report or matrix is true and cor
rect to the best knowledge and belief of a principal officer of
the plan. Finally, a plan is required to notify DMHC within
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staff announced that OPA was already in the process of de
five business days of discovering that any of its RBOs expe
veloping the fall 200 l ("Year l ") report card, and that the
rienced any event which materially alters the RBO's finan
subcommittee's recommendations would pertain to the "Year
cial situation or threatens its solvency.
2" report card due in the fall of 2002.
• Section 1300.75.4.4-Confidentiality. This section states
At its December 2000 and January 200I meetings, sub
that "the Director shall provide for the confidentiality of fi
committee members reviewed HMO report cards already pub
nancial and other records to be produced, disclosed, or other
lished by the Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH), the
wise made available pursuant to Health and Safety Code sec
California Public Employees Re
tion 1375.4, and to these solvency
tirement System (CalPERS), the
regulations, unless the Director
The confidentiality issue continues to be controversial, National Committee for Quality
determines otherwise." Despite
with HMOs and consumer groups arguing in favor of Assurance (NCQA), and the Cali
DMHC's adoption of this emer
public access to RBO financial information and fornia HealthCare Foundation
gency regulation, the confidenti
physician groups strongly opposed.
(CHCF), and received testimony
ality issue continues to be contro
from individuals representing
versial, with HMOs and consumer
those groups on the kinds of information considered in evalu
groups arguing in favor of public access to RBO financial
ating HMO performance. Several report cards and accredita
information and physician groups strongly opposed.
tion systems rely on so-called "HEDIS" and "CAHPS" mea
• Section 1300.75.45-Plan Compliance. This section
sures: The Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set
provides that any failure of a plan to comply with Health and
(HEDIS) evaluates a large number of clinical performance
Safety Code section 1375.4 and these solvency regulations
measures, and most quality reporting systems typically re
shall constitute grounds for disciplinary action by DMHC.
port on whether plans cover nine preventive measures (such
• Section 1300.75.4.6-Department Costs. This section
as immunizations and cancer screening); the Consumer As
specifies that DMHC's costs in administering Health and
sessment of Health Plans Study (CAHPS) is a member satis
Safety Code sections 1347 .15 (which creates FSSB) and
faction instrument which measures satisfaction with getting
1 375.4 (which establishes solvency requirements for RBOs)
needed care, getting care quickly, how well doctors commu
shall be paid by health plans, except specialized health plans,
nicate, the effectiveness of office staff and customer service,
pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 1 356.
claims processing, and overall ratings of primary care doc
At this writing, these emergency regulations are in effect
tors, specialists, and the health plan. Some witnesses urged
for 120 days from March 22, 2001 . On April 6, 2001, DMHC
DMHC to concentrate on use of these existing tools rather
published notice of its intent to permanently adopt the emer
than "reinventing the wheel"; others noted that HEDIS,
gency regulations. Written comments are due by May 22,
CAHPS,
and other evaluation systems are not all-inclusive
2001.
and do not always or consistently measure cost (including
Advisory Committee on Managed Health Care
out-of-pocket cost to enrollees), complaint data, the cultural/
linguistic capacities of plans, and plans' responsiveness to
The 22-member Advisory Committee on Managed Health
Care held its first meeting on October 24, 2000 in Sacramento.
the needs of different populations (such as the Medi-Cal and
Medicare populations). Several witnesses recommended that
After hearing presentations by Assemblymember Martin
DMHC produce several report cards for different audiences
Gallegos (past chair of the Assembly Health Committee and
(and in different languages and in a variety of formats); oth
author of the bill that created the Department), DMHC Di
ers urged DMHC to educate consumers on how to use al
rector Daniel Zingale, and other members of DMHC man
agement, the Committee divided into three subcommittees
ready-existing report cards because the collection of new data
is very disruptive to providers.
that will provide input to the Department on major deliverables
required by AB 78 (Gallegos) and other recent managed care
At its March 2001 meeting, the subcommittee heard a
presentation by Judith Hibbard, Professor of Health Policy at
legislation.
the University of Oregon, an expert in how consumers use
♦ Quality and Performance Measurement Subcommit
report card information and how to format a report card so it
tee. This subcommittee has two major charges:
is more likely to be used in decisionmaking. DMHC staff
• HMO Report Card. The subcommittee is charged with
informed the subcommittee that PBGH had been retained by
developing recommendations for an annual HMO report card
the Department to produce the Year I report card. As to the
on the comparative performance of the managed care organi
Year 2 report card, the subcommittee voted to submit the fol
zations overseen by the Department. The report card is to be
produced by the Office of the Patient Advocate.
lowing recommendations to DMHC: ( 1 ) consumers are the
key audience of the report card, and a key purpose of the
At its December 2000 meeting, the subcommittee noted
that OPA's first report card is not due until the fall of 2001,
report card should be to assist consumers in health plan choice;
and that it will focus on full-service health plans; members
(2) commercial and Medicare populations are separate audi
discussed whether subsequent report cards should also evalu
ences, and reporting for both audiences should be included in
ate specialized plans, provider groups, and hospitals. DMHC
the report card; (3) Medi-Cal enrollees are a separate audi34
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ence, and reporting for Medi-Cal enrollees should be included
(Gallegos) (Chapter 658, Statutes of 1998), which added sec
in the report card; (4) consumers are a regional audience, and
tion 1380.1 to the Health and Safety Code. Section 1380.1
the report card should report findings by region so that the
required the Department of Health Services (DHS) to con
most relevant information for consumers is conveyed and
vene a working group to develop standards for quality audits
of providers that provide services to enrollees of health plans.
available; (5) purchasers of health care (e.g., benefits manag
In December 1999, the so-called "Section 1380. 1 Working
ers at employers) are also a key audience of the report card,
and DMHC/OPA should do outreach to purchasers so they
Group" -which included representatives of plans, consumer
organizations, public and private purchasers of health care,
are aware of the report card and can make report card infor
and providers (including medical groups, independent prac
mation available to employees at the time of health plan choice
and open enrollment; (6) even though they are not a primary
tice associations, and health facilities)-produced a report
entitled Reducing Duplicative Provider Audits: A Strategic
audience, regulators should be encouraged to monitor report
card results; (7) if and when the report card evaluates provid
Blue Print for Action, which included eleven recommenda
ers and/or hospitals, those entities will also be a key audience
tions toward reducing duplicative audits of providers by health
of the report card.
plans. SB 2136 includes several of those recommendations,
The subcommittee also agreed on a framework for re
and now requires DMHC to propose regulatory standards for
a uniform medical quality audit system "which shall include
porting and choosing performance measures for inclusion in
the Year 2 report card: ( 1 ) the report card should include cred
a single periodic medical quality audit." DMHC's regulations
ible, independent, validated, and standardized information;
must identify: ( 1 ) standards that will serve as the basis of the
single periodic medical quality audit; (2) standards that will
(2) the report card should build on existing tools, but some
not be covered by the single periodic medical quality audit
additional measures that are of value to the key audiences
should be included in Year 2 and others should be considered
and that may be audited directly by health plans; and (3) a list
for rollout in Year 3 and beyond; (3) the subcommittee could
of private sector accreditation organizations, if any, that have
or can develop systems comparable to the recommended sys
not agree on whether to include provider group information
tem, and the capability and expertise to accredit , audit , or
in the Year 2 report card; (4) although accreditation informa
tion might be useful to include in a report card, the subcom
credential providers. SB 2136 also authorizes the DMHC
mittee could not make a recommendation about the inclusion
Director to approve private sector accreditation organizations
of accreditation information; (5) the question whether to in
as qualified organizations to perform the periodic audit.
clude HEDIS and CAHPS measures in the Year 2 report card
Gilevich proposed a workplan that includes the follow
requires further consideration; (6) the Year 2 report card should
ing steps: ( 1 ) identification of the problem by stakeholders,
not provide information on hospitals; (7) DMHC Help Cen
with attention paid to the work of the Section 1 380.1 Work
ter complaint and IMR data should be included in the report
ing Group and the purpose of the regulations that the DMHC
card; (8) the Year 2 report card should include additional com
Director is required to adopt; (2) provision of a draft of the
parative information (such as credentialing information, fi
regulations to the subcommittee based on the information
nancial information such as market share and medical loss
provided by stakeholders; and (3) submission of a work prod
ratios, provider turnover rates, assessment of enrollees' lin
uct to the full ACMHC by October 2001. The subcommittee
guistic needs, DMHC medical survey information, and en
approved the workplan.
forcement actions and arbitration results against plans) to the
♦ Regulatory Implementation and Structure Subcom
extent feasible; and (9) the Year 2 report card need not in
mittee. This subcommittee has two major charges:
clude lengthy general information (because this type of in
• Regulatory Consolidation Report. First, the subcom
formation is already provided on DMHC's Web site).
mittee will develop a plan for completing the legislative re• Uniform Medical Quality
port required by AB 78 (Gallegos)
Audit System . The Quality and
on the regulatory framework for
Performance Measurement Sub The subcommittee will develop a plan for completing entities within California's man
committee will also produce rec the legislative report required by AB 78 (Gallegos) on aged care industry. Under Health
ommendations on the develop the regulatory framework for entities within California's and Safety Code section 1342.3,
ment of a uniform medical qual managed care industry.
this report is required to consider
ity audit system, as required by SB
"the feasibility and benefit of con
2136 (Dunn) (Chapter 856, Statutes of 2000) (see 2000 LEG
solidating into DMHC the regulation of other health insurers
ISLATION). Under SB 2136, the DMHC Director is required
providing insurance through indemnity, preferred provider or
to release regulations regarding the standards for a uniform
ganizations, and exclusive provider organization products, as
medical quality audit by January 1, 2002.
well as through other managed care products regulated by
At its March 2001 meeting, the subcommittee heard a
the Department of Insurance." The report is due to the legis
presentation by DMHC counsel Tom Gilevich on pre-SB 2 1 36
lature on December 3 1 , 200 I .
efforts to establish standards for a uniform medical quality
At its November 29, 2000 meeting, the subcommittee
audit system. In 1998 , the legislature passed AB 1 959
after accepting public comment-decided to limit the DecemCalifornia Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) ♦ covers November 1999-April 2001
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ber 31, 200I study to health insurance entities and products
that are currently regulated by the Department of Insurance
(DOI). However, the subcommittee committed to perform
ing a broader study of other entities and health care programs
(including programs under the jurisdiction of other agencies,
such as Healthy Families and Medi-Cal) after concluding the
December 200 I report. The subcommittee also agreed to rec
ommend that DMHC retain an academician consultant to
coordinate and assist in conducting the study and drafting the
report, and decided to solicit testimony and input from health
insurers and health plans, health care providers, health care
purchasers, DOI, the National Association of Insurance Com
missioners, and the National Association of Managed Care
Regulators.
During its meetings in early 2001, the subcommittee fur
ther discussed and identified the precise issues to be addressed
in the study, including the criteria that should guide any rec
ommendation made (including impacts on consumer protec
tion, complaint procedures and handling, revenue, adminis
trative simplification, providers, plans, regulatory consistency,
and protection against "forum shopping") and the options that
should be considered (from the status quo to a complete
merger of DOI-regulated health care entities and products into
DMHC). The subcommittee also solicited expert testimony
to educate itself on the various ways in which health care
coverage is regulated in California.
At its February 2001 meeting, the subcommittee heard
from panels representing insurers, plans, and consumers on
the differences between DMHC regulation of managed care
plans and DOI regulation of preferred provider organizations
(PPOs). Insurance industry representatives predicted that if
PPO regulation is transferred to DMHC, PPOs will try to con
vert to self-insured entities or sell off their PPO business, such
that the PPO industry will diminish. Consumer group repre
sentatives argued that the same reasons that justified the trans
fer of managed care regulation from a generalist non-health
care-focused agency like DOC to a specialist health-care-fo
cused agency like DMHC support the consolidation of the
regulation of all health care insurance products under one
regulator. [ 16:2 CRLR 5-7; CRLR 22-26]
At its April 2001 meeting, the subcommittee heard two
panel presentations-one panel included DMHC and DOI
representatives discussing the agencies' respective consumer
complaint handling programs; the other concerned the regu
latory oversight provided by each agency. During the com
plaint handling panel presentation, staff from both agencies
noted that each receives calls for help that should be directed
to the other. DMHC's consumer complaints relate solely to
health care coverage and quality, while DOI's consumer com
plaints relate to any of 22 different lines of insurance regu
lated by that department. DMHC's hotline functions 24 hours
a day, seven days a week, and its personnel include nurses
and attorneys because they handle some cases in which health
care services have not yet been provided and disputes over
whether care should be provided. DOI's hotline functions only
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during weekdays. Its personnel include no clinical experts
because they deal solely with coverage issues and not with
quality of care issues; quality of care cases are referred to the
Medical Board of California, which licenses physicians. The
subcommittee also heard from Shelley Rouillard, program
director of Health Rights Hotline (HRH), a joint program of
the Center for Health Care Rights and Legal Services of North
ern California, which serves all consumers in four counties
in northern California. HRH's staff receive questions and
complaints from consumers, advise people about their rights
and teach them how to use the health care system, and may
intervene on behalf of consumers with health plans when
necessary. Rouillard related her experience that "there is par
ticular confusion over which agency has jurisdiction over Blue
Shield and Blue Cross PPOs. It is important that one agency
oversee all health plan activities, to make it easier for con
sumers, and to see the big picture of health care."
During the regulatory oversight panel discussion, a
DMHC representative noted that the Knox-Keene Act requires
the Department to conduct detailed "medical surveys" of
health plans every three years (with follow-up surveys within
18 months), and authorizes DMHC to conduct non-routine
surveys as often as necessary. The surveys assess utilization
management (including procedures for pre-authorization and
review of medical necessity and continuity of care), quality
management (including a review of the results of plan ac
tions to improve health care services), access and availability
(including a review of the plan's provider network by type,
number of providers, availability, and timeliness of services),
and grievance system procedures (including whether the plan
acts promptly to investigate and resolve grievances). Follow
ing the survey, DMHC releases a preliminary report, and the
plan has 45 days to comment on that report. DMHC reviews
the plan's response and then issues a final public report which
identifies deficiencies and the plan's progress in making cor
rections. DMHC also conducts financial examinations of
health plans every five years. DOI conducts "market conduct
surveys" (which are similar procedurally to DMHC's "medi
cal surveys" but look only at rating/underwriting and claims
practices) and financial examinations of its insurance com
pany licensees. DOI tries to conduct market conduct surveys
once every three to five years, but is not sufficiently staffed
to meet that goal; thus, most exams are targeted exams based
on high rates of complaints regarding claims settlement prac
tices, delays, or underwriting issues. Between January I 999
and December 2000, DOI conducted only 30 market conduct
exams of life and disability insurance carriers where heal�
claims were part of the examination.
• Grievance System/IMR Regulations. The Regulatory
Implementation and Structure Subcommittee will also assist
in the development of regulations to implement recent legis
lation related to health plan grievance systems and DMHC's
new Independent Medical Review (IMR) system. Effective
January 1 , 2000, SB 189 (Schiff) (Chapter 542, Statutes of
1999) shortened the period of time from 60 to 30 days in

California Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) ♦ covers November /999-April 2001

HEALTH CARE REGULATORY AGENC IES
gela Mora also addressed the subcommittee, and suggested
which health plans and the Department have to review and
ways to maximize use of the funds -by preparing public ser
resolve enrollee grievances; allows an enrollee to seek
vice announcements arid distributing fact sheets and bro
DMHC's review of unresolved gn· evances after 30 days; and
chures. Subcommittee members had additional suggestions,
requires plans to act on emergency grievances within three
including visible publica tion of the Help Center's toll-free
days of receipt of the grievance by the plan (instead of the
number on all DMHC publications, and posting of Help Cen
prior five days). SB 1 89 was joined to AB 55 (Migden) (Chapter information on prescription bottles, in open enrollment
ter 533, Statutes of 1 999), which established-effective J anubenefit packages, and on prescribers' prescription pads. Au
ary 1 , 2001 -a system for the independent review by medidience members suggested advertising through Spanish lan
cal professionals of a plan's decision to deny, modify, or deguage radio stations, community-based newsletters, celebri
lay a health care service because the plan determines that the
ties and sports figures, medical television shows, provider
service is not medically necessary. Pursuant to AB 55, plans
organizations, and health plans, and other advertising targeted
must now include in every plan contract a provision allowing
at consumers who may n ot have access to the Internet (such
enrollees to seek an IMR whenever a health care decision is
as senior citizens, Healthy Family recipients, and low-incoine
based on a finding that the service is not medically necespopulations).
sary; AB 55 also specifies that the IMR may be expedited if
At the subcommittee's February 2001 meeting, DMHC
there is a serious threat to the health of the enrollee. [1 7:1
staff noted that the Help Center had started a pilot program.
CRLR 13]
whereby a consumer who contacts the Help Center with a
Thus, DMHC must establish a process for initial screencomplaint about an HMO is instantly connected with the HMO.
ing of all grievances to determine if an issue of medical nevia a three-way conference call, in which the consumer, the.
cessity is involved, and has the final authority to determine if
HMO, and the Department attempt to resolve the proble�
a grievance meets the definition of "medical necessity" for
immediately. The pilot program had worked successfully with
the purpose of IMR, or whether the grievance should go
Pacificare and was being ex
through the grievance process as
panded to Kaiser Foundatio n
modified by SB 1 89. At its No
vember and December 2000 The subcommittee is charged with reviewing and Health Plan. The pilot was already
meetings, and further at its Feb providing input to the Department on its $2 million resulting in a decline in the num
ruary and April 2001 meetings, targeted consumer education program to inform health ber of pending complaints be
the subcommittee reviewed a pre plan enrollees of the Department's existence and cause the Help Center can achieve
liminary draft of regulations to purpose.
quick problem resolution over the
phone . Subcommittee members
implement SB 1 89 and AB 55,
also reviewed and approved Pa
and took public comment thereon.
tient Advocate Angela Mora's proposed breakdown of the
DMHC was not able to adopt these regulations in time for the·
$2 million allocated for consumer education.
January 1 , 200 1 commencement of the IMR system; until it
At the subcommittee's March 2001 meeting, DMHC staff
does, the DMHC Director will make IMR decisions public
reported that no formal complaints over 30 days old were
through the issuance of an order. At this writing, the subcompending at the HMO Help Center (whereas 69% of the com
mittee has not yet recommended, and the Department has not
plaints pending at the Help Center in January 2000 were over
yet formally published, its grievance system/lMR regulations.
30 days old). Staff also provided subcommittee members with
♦ Health Care Education and Access Subcommittee.
a copy of DMHC's new brochure, Your HMO Rights and
This subcommittee also has two primary charges:
Responsibilities, which wi11 be translated into languages other
• Consumer Education Program. The subcommittee is
than English, turned into placards for posting in physicians'
charged with reviewing and providing input to the Departoffices, and distributed to pharmacies and to legislators' dis
ment on its $2 million targeted consumer education program
to inform health plan enrollees of
trict offices. Staff also noted that
DMHC is attempting to provide
the Department's existence and
The Health Care Education and Access Subcommittee
employers and their human re
purpose. At its December 2000
is also charged with studying issues related to
sources departments with informa
meeting, the subcommittee was
prevention-health care approaches that will prevent
tion on the brochure, because con
addressed by Steven Fi sher,
expensive and debilitating health care problems.
sumers with an HMO problem
DMHC's Deputy Director for
most often contact their human
Communications and Planning,
resources office before contacting their HMO or DMHC.
who reported on the Department's HMO Help Center, which
• Prevention. The Hea1th Care Education and Access Sub
is available via a toll-free number to consumers 24 hours a
committee is also charged with studying issues related to pre
day, 365 days a year in over 1 50 languages, and is staffed by
vention - health care approaches that will prevent expensive
1 00 consumer rights experts. A ccording to Fisher, "the
and debilitating health care problems. The subcommittee is
Department's challenge is to determ ine how to let consumers
to develop a framework for a report regarding the state of
know about the HMO Help Center." Patient Advocate AnCalifornia Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 1 7, No. 2 (Winter 2001) ♦ covers November 1999-April 2001
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prevention in California, including consumer access to pre
vention services. The prevention report should explain the
history of prevention, identify approaches that work, describe
the distribution system, and provide incentives to promote
involvement by plans and providers in prevention approaches.
DMHC's position is that prevention is the key to better qual
ity health care and to ensuring there is more money in the
health care system.
At its December 2000 meeting, the subcommittee re
viewed an article on New Jersey's prevention initiative. At
its February and March 2001 meetings, the subcommittee
invited several experts to make presentations on prevention.
In February, Sara McMenarnin, MPH, Director of Research
at UC Berkeley's Center for Health and Public Policy Stud
ies, noted that although many HMOs offer coverage for pre
ventive services (such as pap smears, childhood immuniza
tions, and well-baby check-ups), most charge a copayment
for them. Further, her research has indicated a trend in HMOs
increasing coverage for some health promotion programs
(such as smoking cessation and physical fitness programs)
while they drop coverage for other such programs (such as
substance abuse, sexually transmitted disease, childhood in
jury, and HIV/AIDS prevention programs). According to
McMenamin, a very low level of members report they have
participated in a health improvement program through their
health plan, and very few plans offer financial incentives to
providers to improve performance on HEDIS preventive
measures (see above). The subcommittee also heard from
Margaret Taylor, MFT, who directs the San Mateo County
Health Services Agency, regarding the Health Plan of San
Mateo's preventive care initiatives. Every patient must have
a history and physical within one year of enrollment, and the
physician must develop a health plan for that patient. San
Mateo's plan also includes a comprehensive perinatal pro
gram which involves incentives to physicians to get more
services to their patients, targeted health promotion interven
tions aimed at diabetes and obesity in children, a smoking
cessation program for pregnant women, and health screen
ings for the elderly.
At its March 2001 meeting, the subcommittee heard a
panel presentation entitled A National Perspective on Improv
ing the Provision of Preventive Services. The subcommittee
was introduced to the Guide to Clinical Preventive Services
(Second Edition), which contains the recommendations on
clinical preventive services of the U.S. Preventive Services
Task Force, which was convened in 1984 to evaluate the ben
efits based on science for each of the individual clinical pre
ventive services based on age, gender, and risk. The end re
sult was the basis of clinical guidelines, which are used by
private accreditation agencies to rate health plans. Addition
ally, a representative of Partnership for Prevention noted that
PFP studied 30 clinical preventive services and identified
several that provide a good value at low cost: tobacco cessa
tion, adolescent counseling, adult vision screening, chlamy
dia screening for young females, colorectal cancer screening
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for persons over 50, adult alcoholism screen, and senior pneu
mococcal vaccinations. Finally, the subcommittee was intro
duced to the Guide to Community Preventive Services, a
major prevention initiative funded by the federal government
and led by the Task Force on Community Preventive Ser
vices, which summarizes what is known about the effective
ness and cost-effectiveness of population-based interventions
designed to promote health and prevent disease, injury, dis
ability, and premature death as well as exposure to environ
mental hazards. The Community Guide is a complement to
the Clinical Guide, and looks outside the health and medical
care system to identify evidence-based prevention strategies
that can assist managed care organizations in disease preven
tion and health promotion.

DMHC Rulemaking

The following is an update on recent DMHC/DOC
rulemaking proceedings, some of which are described in more
detail in Volume 17, No. 1 (Winter 2000) of the California
Regulatory Law Reporter:
♦ Transfer of DMHC's Regulations. On November 14,
2000, DMHC asked OAL to transfer DOC's managed care
regulations from Title IO of the CCR into Title 28 of the CCR.
This regulatory action, which has no substantive effect, sim
ply reflects the July 1, 2000 removal of responsibility for the
regulation of the managed health care industry from DOC to
DMHC. DMHC's regulations were moved to Title 28 effec
tive January 20, 2001.
♦ Hospice Care. AB 892 (Alquist) (Chapter 528, Stat
utes of 1999) added section 1368.2 to the Health and Safety
Code. Section 1368.2 requires all health plan contracts, ex
cept for specialized plan contracts, to include hospice care as
a basic health care service on and after January I , 2002. The
bill further requires the adoption of regulations before Janu
ary I , 2001 to implement section 1368.2. [ 1 7:1 CRLR /6]
On May 12, 2000, DOC published notice of its intent to
amend section 1300.67 and adopt new section 1300.68.2, Title
I O of the CCR, to implement AB 892 (Alquist). The amend
ment to section 1300 .67 adds hospice care to the list of basic
health services that must be covered by health plans. As pro
posed, new section 1300.68.2 would define the terms "be
reavement services," "hospice service," "home health aide
services," "homemaker services," "interdisciplinary team,"
"medical direction," "plan of care," "skilled nursing services,"
"social service/counseling services," "terminal disease or ill
ness," and "volunteer services." "Hospice service" is defined
as a specialized form of interdisciplinary health care that is
designed to provide palliative care; alleviate the physical,
emotional, social, and spiritual discomforts of an enrollee who
is experiencing the last phases of life due to the existence of
a terminal disease; and provide supportive care to the pri
mary care giver and the family of the hospice patient which
meets all of the following criteria: (1) considers the enrollee
and the enrollee's family as the unit of care; (2) utilizes an
interdisciplinary team to assess the physical, medical, psy-
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chological, social, and spiritual needs of the enrollee and the
enrollee's family; (3) requires the interdisciplinary team to
develop an overall plan of care and to provide coordinated
care emphasizing supportive services such as home care, pain
control, and other services intended to ensure both continuity
and appropriateness of care for enrollees who cannot be cared
for at home; (4) provides for the palliative medical treatment
of pain and other symptoms associated with the terminal dis
ease, but does not provide for efforts to cure the disease; (5)
provides for bereavement services following death, to assist
the enrollee's family with their social and emotional needs;
(6) actively utilizes volunteers in the delivery of hospice ser
vices; and (7) to the extent appropriate based on the medical
needs of the enrollee, provides services in the enrollee's home
or primary place of residence.
Section 1300.68.2 requires plans to contract with hos
pices that are either licensed by the state Department of Health
Services or certified in accordance with federal Medicare
conditions of participation; all contracts between plans and
hospices must be in accordance with all federal and state Ii
censure requirements. The section sets forth the hospice ser
vices that plans must provide at a minimum: interdiscipli
nary team care with development and maintenance of an ap
propriate plan of care; skilled nursing services, home health
aide services, and homemaker services under the supervision
of a qualified registered nurse; social services/counseling ser
vices provided by a qualified social worker; medical direc
tion, with the plan's medical director responsible for meeting
the general medical needs of the enrollee to the extent that
these needs are not met by the attending physician; volunteer
services; short-term inpatient care arrangements; pharmaceu
ticals, medical equipment, and supplies that are reasonable
and necessary for the palliation and management of the ter
minal illness and related conditions; and certain rehabilita
tive therapies including physical therapy, occupational
therapy, and speech-language pathology for purposes of symp
tom control or to enable the enrollee to maintain activities of
daily living and basic functional skills. These services must
be available on a 24-hour basis, and may be provided in the
home or a facility. Finally, every plan must include notice
and evidence of the hospice coverage in its disclosure form.
DOC held no public hearing on its proposal, but accepted
written comments until June 30, 2000. Thereafter, DMHC
slightly revised the proposed regulations based on the com
ments received, and released the modified version for an ad
ditional 15-day comment period on December 21, 2000. Sub
sequently, DMHC approved the proposed regulations and for
warded them to OAL, where they are pending approval at
this writing.
♦ Outpatient Prescription Drug Benefits. Effective
November 3, 2000, DMHC adopted new section 1300.67.24,
Title 10 of the CCR, on an emergency basis. Section
l 30q.67.24 expressly states that every health plan that pro
vides prescription drugs shall provide coverage for all medi
cally necessary outpatient prescription drugs. Consistent with

the Knox-Keene Act, plans may require prior authorization
for coverage of these drugs; they may establish copayments
or deductibles for these drugs; and they may establish pre
ferred drug lists and formularies relating to prescription drug
benefits. However, DMHC's intent in adopting section
1300.67.24 is to notify plans that they must also provide any
other prescription drug to the extent that it is medically nec
essary for a particular enrollee.
On November 24, 2000, the Department published no
tice of its intent to permanently adopt section 1300.67.24.
Following a public hearing on January 19, 200 I in Sacra
mento, DMHC adopted the proposed section. OAL approved
it on April 16, 2001 and it became effective that day.
♦ Enrollee Grievance Process. Prior to 1999, the Knox
Keene Act required all health plans to establish and maintain
a grievance process approved by the Department under which
enrollees and subscribers may submit grievances to the plan;
after completing or participating in a plan's grievance pro
cess for at least 60 days, an enrollee or subscriber may sub
mit the grievance or complaint to the Department for review.
SB 189 (Schiff) (Chapter 542, Statutes of 1999) modifies this
system to require plans to complete the grievance process in
30 days (rather than 60 days), and in three days (instead of
five days) in cases involving an imminent and serious threat
to the health of the patient-after which time period the pa
tient may submit the grievance to DMHC; and directs DMHC
to investigate and take enforcement action against plans re
garding grievances that involve plan noncompliance with the
law. [1 7:1 CRLR 13]
On May 30, 2000, DOC amended section 1 300.68 and
adopted new section 1300.68.0 I , Title 10 of the CCR, on an
emergency basis to conform its regulations to the require
ments of SB 189 (Schiff). DOC's amendments to section
1300.68 establish definitions for terms used in the statute and
regulations (including "grievance," "complaint," and "re
solved") and require plans to establish (in writing) grievance
systems that receive, handle, and resolve grievances within
30 calendar days of receipt. The section includes minimum
required features for all plan grievance systems, including a
new requirement mandating plan retention of grievances, re
sponses, and all medical records, documents, evidence of
coverage, and other relevant information for five years. The
amendments also set forth the process for the Department's
review of a plan's response to a grievance at the request of an
enrollee, and set forth the information that must be submitted
by the plan to the Department. DOC also amended section
l 300.68(d), which describes the form on which plans, on a
quarterly basis, must report to the Department all grievances
that are pending and unresolved for 30 days or more. Under
DOC's amendments, the quarterly report need not include
information on grievances filed and/or processed outside the
plan's grievance system in other grievance resolution proce
dures, such as arbitration, voluntary mediation, the Center
for Dispute Resolution (an independent review organization),
the Department of Social Services, or DOC.
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New section 1300.68.01 establishes requirements for a
plan's expedited review of grievances in cases involving im
minent and serious threat to the health of the enrollee. The
new section requires plans to consider an enrollee's medical
condition when determining its response time, and requires
plans to furnish the Department with contact information for
a primary contact person and at least two back-up contact
persons who will handle urgent and emergency contacts by
the Department regarding urgent grievances.
On June 23 , 2000, DOC published notice of its intent to
permanently adopt its emergency amendments to section
1300.68 and new section 1300.68.01. However, DOC never
finished that rulemaking process because managed care regu
lation was transferred to DMHC effective July 1, 2000. On
August 14 , 2000, DMHC repealed DOC's emergency regu
lations (which were still in effect) and adopted its own emer
gency amendments to section 1300.68 and new section
1300.68.01. DMHC's emergency regulations are similar to
DOC's regulations, except that DMHC amended section
1300.68 to delete the definitions adopted by DOC, restruc
ture the order of the provision, and expand the kinds of non
plan grievances that need not be included on the quarterly
report form to include the Medi-Cal Fair Hearing Process.
Additionally, DMHC amended section 1300.68.0l(b) to spe
cifically require plans to establish a system that provides for
receipt of Department contacts regarding urgent grievances
24 hours per day, seven days per week.
DMHC's emergency regulations went into effect on Au
gust 14, 2000. Thereafter, on September I, 2000, DMHC
published notice of its intent to permanently adopt its emer
gency changes to sections 1300.68 and 1300.68.1; after a 45day comment period, the Department adopted the proposed
changes and forwarded them to OAL, which approved them
on January 10, 2001.
♦ Medical Care Following Stabili1,lllion of Emergency
Medical Condition. In June 1999, DOC amended section
1300.71.4, Title IO of the CCR, on an emergency basis. Section
1300.71.4 sets forth emergency medical condition and post-sta
bilization responsibilities of health plans for medically neces
sary health care services. The amendments, which clarify that a
health plan is responsible for post-stabilization emergency care
regardless of whether the services are administered by a con
tracting or non-contracting provider, are required under AB 682
(Morrow) (Chapter 1015, Statutes of 1998). [1 7:1 CRLR 12] In
July 1999, the Department published notice of its intent to per
manently adopt the amendments to section 1300.71.4. DOC held
no public hearing on its proposal, but accepted written comments
until August 27. Thereafter, then-Acting DOC Commissioner
William Kenefick approved the proposal; OAL approved the
amendments on November 8, 1999.

OAL Invalidates DOC's Assessment Calculation

In February 1999, Healthdent of California Inc. filed a
petition with OAL challenging as "underground rulemaking"
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the method utilized by the Department of Corporations for
calculating the number of enrollees in health plans for the
purpose of assessing annual fees. Under the Knox-Keene Act,
each licensee plan must pay an annual fee to its regulator
which, at that time, was the Department of Corporations. The
purpose of the fee is to reimburse the Department for the costs
associated with administering the Knox-Keene Act. The
amount of the fee is assessed based on the number of enroll
ees in the plan.
Healthdent arranges for its subscribers to receive den
tal care through contracts with other dental providers, and
it also operates its own dental care facilities. At its facili
ties, Healthdent provides services to its own subscribers
as well as to subscribers of other health plans. In deter
mi ning Healthdent's annual assessment, the Commis
sioner counted not only Healthdent's own subscribers, but
also "enrollees obtai ned through contracts with other
plans."
In OAL Determination No. 5, Docket No. 99-007 (Feb
ruary 24, 2000), 0 AL first noted that under Corporations Code
section 25 614 , Admi ni strative Procedure Act (APA)
rulemaking requirements are applicable to the Department.
Next, OAL found that "the requirement for paying an annual
assessment or fee applies generally to member of a 'class,
kind or order.' That class would encompass a ll Knox
Keene health care servi ce plans licensed by the
Commissioner....Therefore, the Commissioner's method of
determining the amount of annual fees to be paid by health
care service plans is a standard of general application," such
that APA rulemaking requirements apply.
The Department asserted that "there is no rule because
whatever assessment is made is the consequence or result of
transactions occurring between various health care plans."
OAL disagreed, stating: "Of regulatory necessity, the Com
missioner must determine who is an ' enrollee' for purposes
of assessing these fees .... The Commissioner has done
this....The rule essentially states that ' enrollees' in health care
service plans may be 'acquired' through subcontracts with
other plans. That is the 'regulation' which interprets, imple
ments or makes specific the term 'enrollees' as it is used in
the statute."
Next, OAL a ddressed the question of whether the
Department's interpretation of the statutory requirement was
the only legally tenable one. "If a rule simply applies an ex
isting constitutional, statutory or regulatory requirement that
has only one legally tenable ' interpretation,' that rule is not
quasi-legislative in nature-no new ' law' is created." By
claiming that "the procedure followed by the Commissioner
to calculate the annual assessment for Healthdent is a direct
application of Health and Safety Code section 1 356(b)," the
Department invoked this issue.
OAL pointed out that the Department's claim that it was
merely following the statutory mandate by "counting all the
enrollees in every plan" amounted to a circular argument "be-
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cause the term 'enrollees' means anyone so labeled by the
Department." OAL looked to Health and Safety Code sec
tion 1345(c), which defines "enrollee" as a "person who is
enrolled in a plan and who is a recipient of services from
the plan" (emphasis added by OAL). "The Department's
'only tenable' interpretation appears to ignore or even oblit
erate the separate elements necessary for enrollment found
in the statute. In doing this, the Department introduces the
concept of acquiring enrollees through subcontracts." Find
ing that the Department's interpretation was not the only
tenable one, and perhaps not even the most reasonable one
under the existing statutory and regulatory scheme, OAL
concluded that the Commissioner's method of calculation
of the number of enrollees amounted to an underground regu
lation that is invalid unless adopted according to APA
rulemaking requirements.

care providers-as many as 25 for some physician officesincrease costs for health care providers and health plans, and
thus ultimately increase costs for the purchaser and the con
sumer and result in the direction of limited health care re
sources to administrative costs instead of to patient care; and
that streamlining the multiple medical quality audits required
by health plans and insurers is vital to increasing the resources
directed to patient care. In an attempt to avoid duplicative
medical quality audits of health care providers, SB 2136 re
quires ACMHC to recommend to the DMHC Director stan
dards for a uniform medical quality audit system which shall
include a single periodic medical quality audit. In develop
ing the standards, ACMHC must seek input from a broad and
balanced range of interested parties. The bill further requires
the DMHC Director to publish proposed regulations for the
system on or before January 1 , 2002. ACMHC must also in
clude standards that will not be covered by the single audit
but that may be audited directly by the health plan, and a list
2000 LEG ISLATION
of private sector accreditation organizations that have or can
AB 2903 (Committee on Health), as amended August
develop systems comparable to the recommended system (see
29, 2000, is a technical clean-up bill to the Assembly's man
MAJOR PROJECTS). SB 2136 was signed by the Governor
aged care reform bills of 1999. This bill renames the Depart
on September 28, 2000 (Chapter 856, Statutes of 2000).
ment of Managed Care (as it was called in AB 78) to "De
AB 1455 (Scott), as amended August 30, 2000, and SB
partment of Managed Health Care" and replaces incorrect
1177 (Perata), as amended August 3 1 , 2000, are identical
references to DOC with references to DMHC; clarifies that
bills that prohibit health plans from engaging in "unfair pay
DMHC employees are not prohibited from being plan enroll
ment patterns" resulting in payment delays, reduced payments,
ees; and clarifies the DMHC Director's authority to halt a
denials of complete and accurate claims, or failure to pay in
health plan's act or practice that is unsafe and injurious to an
enrollee. This bill also permits the Department of Insurance
terest due; authorize providers to report such misconduct to
DMHC; and authorize the Director to investigate such com
to contract with DMHC to administer independent medical
plaints and to impose sanctions where the Director finds an
reviews; clarifies that a "disputed health care service" under
"unfair payment pattern" to have occurred. If a plan engages
the Independent Medical Review System does not include
in unfair payment patterns, DMHC is authorized to impose
services provided by a specialized health care service plan,
monetary penalties, order the plan to pay claims in an accel
or an individual dental-only or vision-only health insurance
erated manner for three years, and collect its costs incurred
policy; and deletes inadvertent language that contradicts com
for investigative and enforcement expenses. These bills ad
parable Insurance Code provisions relative to contraceptive
ditionally increase the interest rate on uncontested provider
coverage. AB 2903 was signed by the Governor on Septem
claims that are not paid by a plan within a prescribed time
ber 28, 2000 (Chapter 857, Statutes of 2000).
period to 15% per annum, and impose a $IO charge on a plan
SB 2094 (Committee on Insurance), as amended Au
that fails to automatically include this interest amount in its
gust 28, 2000, is a technical clean-up bill to the Senate's man
payment to a provider.
aged care reform bills of 1 999, including SB 1 9 (Figueroa)
The bills also prohibit plans
(Chapter 536, Statutes of 1999),
from denying a claim based on
which regulates the disclosure of
medical information ; SB 260 AB 1455 and SB 1177 revise the dispute resolution lack of authorization if four re
(Speier) (Chapter 529, Statutes of process for medical service payment claims between quirements are met: ( l ) the ser
vice was medically necessary; (2)
1 999), which creates FSSB and re medical providers and health plans.
the service related to previously
quires regulation of RBOs; SB 59
authorized services; (3) the service was provided after busi
(Perata) (Chapter 539, Statutes of 1999), which sets forth re
ness hours; and (4) the plan does not have an after-hours au
quirements for health plans engaging in utilization review;
thorization process.
and SB 189 (Schiff) (Chapter 542, Statutes of 1 999), which
AB 1 455 and SB 1 177 also revise the dispute resolution
expedites health plans' internal grievance processes. SB 2094
was signed by the Governor on September 30, 2000 (Chapter
process for medical service payment claims between medi
cal providers and health plans. The bills require health plan
1067, Statutes of 2000).
contracts with medical providers to include a fast, fair, and
SB 2136 (Dunn), as amended August 29, 2000, makes
cost-effective dispute resolution mechanism; require this
findings that multiple required medical quality audits of health
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mechanism to be accessible to non-contracting medical pro
viders for billing disputes; and require health plans to annu
ally submit a dispute resolution report to DMHC. On or be
fore July I , 2001, DMHC must adopt regulations that ensure
that plans have adopted a dispute resolution mechanism pur
suant to this bill; those regulations must define the term "com
plete and accurate claim." By December 30, 2001, DMHC
must file a report with the legislature and Governor setting
forth its recommendations for any additional statutory require
ments relating to plan and provider dispute resolution mecha
nisms. The report must also include information regarding
DMHC's development of the definition of "unjust pattern"
(as used in these bills), a description of the process used and
a list of the parties involved in the Department's develop
ment of this definition, and recommendations for statutory
adoption. DMHC must also make information regarding ac
tions taken on payment practices available upon public re
quest and on its Web site; provide a toll-free telephone and
email service by which medical providers and health plans
may report possible unfair payment patterns; and report to
the legislature the process by which it responds to these pat
terns. The Governor signed AB 1455 (Chapter 827, Statutes
of 2000) and SB 1177 (Chapter 825, Statutes of 2000) on
September 28, 2000.
AB 1751 (Kuehl) , as amended May 26, 2000, the
"Patient's Right to Trial Act," would have prohibited health
plans and disability insurers from including a provision in
their contracts that requires enrollees or policyholders to
submit to binding arbitration to resolve disputes arising un
der the contract or policy; and provided that any pre-dispute
binding arbitration clause inserted into a health plan con
tract or disability insurance policy is void and unenforce
able. The bill's author, Assembly Judiciary Committee Chair
Sheila James Kuehl, whose effort was supported strongly
by consumer groups, said AB 1751 was necessary to further
the purpose of SB 21 (Figueroa) (Chapter 536, Statutes of
1999), which permits health plan enrollees and subscribers
to sue their plans for negligence under certain circumstances
(including a requirement that they suffer "substantial harm");
the author and patient groups insisted that the routine ten
dency of HMOs to insert non-negotiable binding arbitra
tion clauses in their contracts nullifies the potential impact
of SB 21. [1 7:1 CRLR 8, 14] Although HMOs defend arbi
tration as a quick and inexpensive way to resolve disputes,
consumer groups insist the private arbitration systems used
by HMOs are unfair to consumers, shrouded in secrecy, and
take too long when a patient's life may be at stake. Up against
heavy opposition by HMOs and "tort reformers,"
Assemblymember Kuehl was forced to shelve AB 1751 in
June 2000.
AB 2039 (Kuehl), as amended May 3, 2000, was carried
by Assemblymember Kuehl at the request of the Governor
when he signed SB 21 (Figueroa) in 1999, which permits
enrollees to sue their health plan for negligence under certain
circumstances. SB 21 generally provides that a person may
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not maintain a cause of action again a health plan unless he/
she has exhausted the Department's Independent Medical
Review remedy. However, that general rule is subject to sev
eral exceptions. Specifically, a patient who has suffered "sub
stantial harm," including "significant financial loss," need not
participate in IMR if his/her substantial harm, including sig
nificant financial loss, either "occurred prior to completion
of the applicable review" or "will imminently occur prior to
completion of the applicable review." AB 2039 would have
precluded an injured patient who suffers significant
out-of-pocket losses from proceeding to court without com
pleting IMR, except in the narrow instance when a judge finds,
as a matter of law, that exhaustion by the patient of the appli
cable independent review system would be futile under the
circumstances. Consumer groups argued that the bill would
have gutted one of the most hard-fought HMO reforms of
1999. On May 10, 2000, the Assembly Judiciary Committee
rejected AB 2039 on a 3-8 bipartisan vote.
SB 1746 (Figueroa), as amended August 24, 2000, re
quires a health plan to notify enrollees thirty days prior to
terminating a contractual arrangement with a medical group,
IPA, or primary care provider. This requirement applies un
less the contract has been terminated because the provider
has endangered the health and safety of patients, committed
criminal or fraudulent acts, or engaged in grossly unprofes
sional conduct. If an enrollee has not been given the requisite
thirty-day notice where required, the enrollee may self-refer
within the plan for up to sixty days or until a new provider is
chosen or assigned, whichever occurs first. The bill also re
quires a plan that relies on providers to have a process in
place to ensure that patients who do not have a provider have
access to medical care, including access to specialists. SB
1746 was signed by the Governor on September 28, 2000
(Chapter 849, Statutes of 2000).
SB 1471 (Schiff), as amended August 28, 2000, prohib
its a health plan, insurer, medical group, or IPA lien for reim
bursement of health care service costs from exceeding the
amount actually paid for those services. This provision does
not apply to a lien made against a workers' compensation
claim, against a third party for Medi-Cal benefits, and for
hospital services, as specified. SB 147 l comes in response to
several class action lawsuits filed by enrollees against HMOs
challenging the HMOs' practice of filing and then suing to
enforce liens against moneys recovered by these enrollees
from third-party tortfeasors. Rather than seeking the actual
costs paid, the HMOs file liens for the "listed" or "reason
able" rates for medical services rendered; these "reasonable"
rates sometimes exceed the actual cost to the plan and, when
recovered from an enrollee, result in a windfall for the HMO.
A 1999 Los Angeles Times article highlighted the windfall
gained by HMOs filing and enforcing liens in excess of the
actual payments they made to treating medical providers, re
sulting in an estimated $765.7 million received in 1998. SB
1471 was signed by the Governor on September 28, 2000
(Chapter 848, Statutes of 2000).
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SB 168 (Speier), as amended August 30, 2000, prohibits
the Legislative Analyst to review data and research relating
to the cost-effectiveness of substance abuse treatment ser
a risk-based contract between a health plan and a physician
vices in health plans and disability insurance policies. This
or physician group from including, as a condition of accept
bill also requires the Legislative Analyst to survey a sample
ing the contract, a provision requiring the physician or group
of health plans, review informa
to assume the financial risk of inc urring the costs of required child SB 1764 (Chesbro) requires the Legislative Analyst to tion on entities that provide alco
hol and drug treatment services,
hood immunizations. This bill also
review data and research relating to the cost
and report findings to the legisla
provides that a physician or phy
effectiveness of substance abuse treatment services
ture. SB 1764 was signed by the
sician group shall not be required in health plans and disability insurance policies.
Governor on September 1, 2000
to assume financial risk for immu(Chapter 305, Statutes of 2000).
nizations that are not a part of the
SB 1839 (Speier), as amended August 28, 2000, would
current contract, and requires plans to reimburse physicians
have required health plans and disability insurers to cover
or physician groups for such immunizations, until the con
routine patient care costs associated with Phase II and III clini
tract is renegotiated. Health plans are also prohibited from
cal trials for life-threatening prostate cancer, if the clinical
including the acquisition costs associated with required child
trial is provided in California and the patient's physician cer
hood immunizations in the capitation rate of a physician who
tifies that it is likely to be more beneficial than any available
is individually capitated. SB 168 was signed by the Governor
standard treatment. On September 30, 2000, the Governor
on September 28, 2000 (Chapter 845, Statutes of 2000).
vetoed SB 1839, stating: "I believe that health plans should
AB 2168 (Gallegos), as amended August 22, 2000, clari
cover the cost of routine patient care for enrollees participat
fies existing law to ensure that health plans establish and
implement procedures by which enrollees with HIV or AIDS
ing in clinical trials - in fact, it should not even be
controversial....However, under this bill, thousands of Cali
may receive a referral to a specialist or specialty care center
fornians suffering from breast cancer and other cancers would
that has expertise in treating HIV or AIDS. This provision
continue to be denied coverage. I favor a more comprehen
sunsets on January l , 2004, or upon the adoption of an ac
sive approach, one which would cover other cancer trials in
creditation or designation by a state or federal agency or by a
addition to prostate ... .l intend to sponsor this legislation for
national organization of AIDS or HIV specialists, whichever
introduction on the first day of the next legislative session,
comes first. AB 2168 was signed by the Governor on Sep
and I will be requesting swift passage" (see 2001 LEGISLA
tember 12, 2000 (Chapter 426, Statutes of 2000).
TION for description of SB 37 (Speier)).
SB 2046 (Speier), as amended August 18, 2000, prohib
AB 525 (Kuehl and Thomson) , as amended August 14,
its health plan contracts and disability insurance contracts from
2000, requires health plans, disability insurers, and Medi-Cal
excluding coverage for a drug prescribed for a chronic and
managed care plans to provide specific information and dis
seriously debilitating condition, including "off label drugs"
closures to consumers in order to assist them in obtaining
(drugs prescribed for a use that does not appear on the drug's
access to needed reproductive health services. The potential
labeling that has been specifically approved by the U.S. Food
enrollee must be infmmed that some hospitals and other pro
and Drug Administration) that are on the plan's formulary;
viders do not provide family planning, contraceptive service,
the bill further requires plans health plans to maintain an ex
sterilization, infertility treatments, or abortion, even though
peditious process by which prescribing providers may obtain
authorization for medically necessary nonformulary drugs to
the services may be covered under the plan contract. AB 525
was signed by the Governor on September 7, 2000 (Chapter
treat chronic and seriously debilitating conditions.
347 , Statutes of 2000).
SB 2046 expands legislation enacted in 1992- AB 1985
(Speier) (Chapter 1268, Statutes of 1992)- which provides
AB 726 (Gallegos), as amended January 27, 2000, would
have required that all monies resulting from conversion of a
patients facing life-threatening conditions with access to off
nonprofit health care service plan to a for-profit plan be di
label drugs. Supporters argued that patients with disabling or
chronic conditions-such as those who suffer from cancer,
rected to the fund of the Major Risk Medical Insurance Pro
HIV infection or AIDS, sickle cell anemia, multiple sclero
gram (MRMIP), a state-sponsored health insurance risk pool
sis, cystic fibrosis, and cerebral palsy- require complex care
that provides health care coverage to certain persons with
involving multiple providers and highly specialized services,
preexisting conditions who are unable to obtain or afford
supplies, and equipment. In treating these patients, physicians
health care coverage. The purpose of this bill was to help
have no choice but to tum to innovative uses of FDA-approved
uninsured individuals to gain access to health insurance cov
drugs because there may be no therapeutic alternatives. Such
erage by assisting the overburdened and underfunded MRMIP.
off-label uses may save, prolong, and/or improve the lives of
On September 28, 2000, the Governor vetoed AB 726, not
these patients by making it possible for them to sustain inde
ing that "the bill is inconsistent with the direction I provided
pendent functioning. SB 2046 was signed by the Governor
in the 2000-01 Budget Act." The Governor stated that it is
on September 28, 2000 (Chapter 852, Statutes of 2000).
inappropriate to direct to one program all of the potential fund
SB 1764 (Chesbro), as amended May 26, 2000, requires
ing generated by nonprofit plan conversion-which funding
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is currently provided to multiple programs serving a range of
health care needs. He further stated that "a large, one-time
infusion of funds to this program, which is currently funded
from tobacco taxes, would not be particularly useful in re
solving any ongoing funding needs for this program."
SB 195 (Chesbro), as amended August 7, 2000, alters
the number of geographic areas that a small health plan can
use to determine its premium rates under the Small Employer
Group Health Coverage Reform Act of 1992 (SGRA) enacted
in AB 1672 (Margolin) (Chapter 1128, Statutes of 1992). [12:4
CRLR 149] SGRA was designed to ensure that small busi
nesses could gain access to affordable health care coverage,
and to prevent discriminatory underwriting practices that
would exclude or price small employers out of the health care
coverage market. SGRA established limits on the variability
of health plan and insurer premiums for small employee
groups. Health plans may charge 90-110% of a standard rate
in a geographic region. This bill provides small health plans
that do not operate statewide with more flexibility in estab
lishing rates for the small employer (2 to 50 employees) mar
ket. SGRA specifies a formula for determining the number of
geographic regions a small health plan may use in setting
small employer health care rates. When that formula results
in only one allowable region, this bill permits a small plan
that operates in more than one county to have two geographic
regions, as long as no county is divided into more than one
region. SB 195 was signed by the Governor on September 8 ,
2000 (Chapter 389, Statutes of 2000).
SB 265 (Speier), as amended August 30, 2000, revises
California law to conform to the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and re
quires health plans and disability insurers to issue HIPAA
coverage to federally eligible individuals at certain premium
rates beginning July I , 2000. This bill defines a "federally
eligible individual" as an individual who (a) has had 18 or
more months of prior group coverage; (b) is not otherwise
eligible for health coverage; (c) was not terminated from his/
her most recent health coverage plan due to nonpayment of
premiums or fraud; and (d) has exhausted any Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) or Cal-CO
BRA continuation coverage. AB 265 was signed by the Gov
ernor on September 28, 2000 (Chapter 810, Statutes of 2000).
SB 764 (Speier), as amended August 18 , 2000, brings
California into conformance with federal law governing Medi
care supplemental insurance (also known as "Medigap insur
ance"). In recent legislation, Congress mandated that each
state bring its Medigap legislation into conformance with the
revised standards set forth in a model regulation established
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in
April 1998. The deadline for state compliance was April 24,
1999. SB 764 was signed by the Governor on September 25,
2000 (Chapter 706, Statutes of 2000).
SB 1903 (Speier), as amended August 29, 2000, applies
provisions of the existing Confidentiality of Medical Infor
mation Act (CMIA), which generally prohibit health care pro44

viders and contractors from sharing or selling a patient's
medical information, to corporations and their subsidiaries
and affiliates; and specifies that any person or entity seeking
an individual's medical information, other than those specifi
cally authorized to do so pursuant to the CMIA, must obtain
valid authorization for release of the information. SB 1903
was signed by the Governor on September 30, 2000 (Chapter
1066, Statutes of 2000).
The following bills reported in Volume 17, No. 1 (Win
ter 2000) died in committee or otherwise failed to be enacted
during 2000: AB 138 (Gallegos), which would have allocated
funds for an independent health care ombudsprogram; AB
368 (Kuehl), which would have required health plans cover
ing prosthetic aids or visual aids to provide such coverage for
individuals with low vision; AB 735 (Knox), relating to pen
alties for late payment by health plans; AB 888 (Wayne),
requiring health plans to report a calculation of their actual or
expected loss ratios; AB 1283 (Baugh), relating to indepen
dent review of plans' health coverage decisions; AB 1285
(Baugh), which would have enacted various provisions ap
plicable to health plans ; SB 7 (Figueroa) and SB 18
(Figueroa), which, like the successful SB 59 (Perata) in 1999,
would have required persons making medical necessity or
appropriateness decisions to be appropriately licensed; SB
217 (Baca), which would have required plans to annually
survey the satisfaction of their subscribers and enrollees; SB
254 (Speier), relating to health plan grievance procedures;
SB 292 (Figueroa), relating to second opinions; SB 337
(Figueroa), prohibiting a health plan with more than 25,000
enrollees from expending or allocating more than 15% of its
gross revenues as administrative costs; SB 420 (Figueroa),
which was similar to the successful AB 78 (Gallegos) in 1999;
and SB 422 (Figueroa), requiring denials or modifications
of prior authorizations to be communicated to enrollees in
writing.
The following bills reported in Volume 17, No. 1 (Win
ter 2000) were subsequently amended and are no longer rel
evant to the regulation of managed care: AB 1124 (Havice),
AB 1621 (Thomson), and SB 362 (Alpert).

2001 LEGISLATION

SB 458 (Escutia), as amended April 17, 2001, is essen
tially a reintroduction of AB 1751 (Kuehl}, which failed in
2000 (see above). SB 458 would amend Civil Code 3428, the
"right to sue" provision added by SB 21 (Figueroa) in 1999,
to provide that a health plan is liable "in a court of law" when
it fails to comply with its duty to exercise ordinary care in
arranging for the provision of medically appropriate health
care services to its enrollees and its subscribers, and that fail
ure results in the denial, delay, or modification of the health
care service, and the enrollee or subscriber suffers substan
tial harm. According to the author, this bill is necessary to
clarify that the new statutory right to sue health plans in SB
21 is not compromised by pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
clauses in health plans' contracts. [S. Jud]
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SB 37 (Speier), as amended April 16, 2001, is Senator
SB 801 (Speier), as amended April 23, 2001, would re
Speier's response to the Governor's 2000 veto of SB 1839
quire the DMHC Director to assist in non-binding negotia
(Speier) (see above). SB 37 would require health plans and
tions between a health care provider and a health plan when a
certain disability insurers to cover the cost of health care ser
new contract cannot be reached and negotiations have been
vices related to a cancer patient's enrollment in a cancer clini
in progress for at least 30 days, or notices have been sent to
cal trial , if the patient's physician has recommended partici
enrollees informing them of the contract termination. [S. Appr]
pation in the trial. However, plans and insurers would not be
AB 1600 (Keeley), as amended April 30, 2001, would
responsible for costs related to a drug or device not approved
authorize health care providers on a class basis and health
by the FDA, management of the trial, the enrollee's travel
plans to negotiate any contract term or condition and upon an
and nonclinical expenses, or items and services provided free
impasse, as defined, to submit the dispute to mediation and,
if unsuccessful, to refer the matter to arbitration. Sponsored
to the enrollee by the research sponsors. [S. Appr]
SB 686 (Ortiz) , as amended April 17 , 200 1 , would
by CMA, the bill would also require the Department to adopt
change the way DMHC calculates
regulations prior to July 1, 2002,
administrative assessments on
pertaining to these mediation and
health plans. Specifically, this bill CMA and numerous other health care provider trade arbitration processes. CMA and
would require full-service health associations argue that AB 1600 will allow providers numerous other health care pro
plans to pay $12,500 plus 80 cents to obtain contracts that are fair, reasonable, and vider trade associations argue that
per enrollee per year; specialized sufficientto assure patient access; opponents-led by AB 1600 will allow providers to
health plans would pay $7 ,500 the HMOs and the California Chamber of Commerce obtain contracts that are fair, rea
plus 30 cents per enrollee per year. argue that this bill will have the effect of granting health sonable, and sufficient to assure
care providers immunity from federal antitrust laws by patient access; opponents-led by
[S. Appr]
SB 492 (Scott), as amended permitting them to collude in negotiating managed care the HMOs and the California
April 16, 2001, would add a den contracts.
Chamber of Commerce-argue
tist to the ACMHC (thus increasthat this bill will have the effect
ing the membership of ACMHC from 22 to 23 members) and
of granting health care providers immunity from federal anti
specify that the additional member shall be a dentist in active
trust laws by permitting them to collude in negotiating man
practice, with five years of experience in providing services
aged care contracts. [A. Health]
to enrollees of a dental service plan, and shall be appointed
SB 1092 (Sher), as amended April 17, 2001, would make
changes in the grievance system required at each plan by the
by the Governor. The bill would also amend SB 2136 Dunn,
enacted in 2000 (see above), to provide DMHC with a six
Knox-Keene Act. This bill would define "grievance" to in
month extension of the deadline for publishing proposed uni
clude any written or oral expression of dissatisfaction, and
any dispute, request for reconsideration , or appeal made by a
form medical quality audit regulations; under SB 492, DMHC
must publish those regulations by July 1 , 2002. [S. Appr]
subscriber or enrollee or by his/her representative to a plan or
SB 103 (Speier), as amended April 4, 200 1 , is intended
to an entity to which a plan has delegated authority to resolve
to address the abrupt "doctor switching" that occurs when
grievances on behalf of the plan. The bill also defines the
health plans cut off medical groups due to contractual dis
term "complaint" and distinguishes between a "grievance"
putes and providers are thus terminated. If a patient's physi
and a "complaint." SB 1092 would also require plans to main
cian is no longer an authorized provider, the patient must
tain a written or electronic log of all complaints. This log
shall contain the date of the call, the name of the complain
switch physicians. If the patient wants to keep that physician
ant, the member identification number, the nature of the com
as his/her provider, the patient typically must wait until the
plaint, the nature of the resolution, and the identification of
next "open enrollment period" before he/she can switch plans
(thus necessitating a switch to a new physician in the mean
the plan representative who took the call and resolved the
time). According to the author, this imposed "doctor switch
complaint. This complaint log shall be reviewed by the plan
ing" is not fair to patients or doctors and corrupts the
officer responsible for the grievance process. [S. Appr]
patient-doctor relationship that is critical to the quality of care.
AB 142 (Richman), as amended March 29, 2001, would
prohibit- effective July 1, 2002-a contract between a phy
SB 1 03 would require health plans and disability insurers to
provide continuity of care from a terminated provider to an
sician or physician group and a health plan from requiring
enrollee or insured for any condition, and extend that period
the physician or physician group to be at financial risk for the
following medical services when covered under the contract:
of coverage until the commencement date of the enrollee's
next open enrollment period. The bill would delete the con
chemotherapeutic medications and adjunct pharmaceutical
ditions described under existing law that excuse the plan or
therapies; drugs, medication, or blood products for hemophili
insurer from providing continuity of care coverage, and in
acs; medications related to transplants; injectable medication
costing more than $500 per patient per calendar year; vac
stead require a contract between a provider and a plan or in
surer to specify reimbursement rates payable in those circum
cines; and self-injectable medications. The bill would also
stances. [S. Appr]
define "financial risk" to include capitation payments, case
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potential enrollee solely on the grounds that the enrollee or
rates, risk pools, and other reimbursement methods other than
a fee-for-service rate structure. [A. Appr]
potential enrollee does not reside within a particular region
of the state. [A . Health]
SB 599 (Chesbro), as amended April 25, 2001, would
AB 1311 (Goldberg), as amended April 24, 2001, would
require health plans, disability insurers, and self-insured em
require health care providers to provide a copy, at no charge,
ployee welfare benefit plans to provide coverage for the treat
of all or any portion of the patient's records to the patient or
ment of substance abuse disorders on the same basis as they
the patient's representative, upon proof that the record is
provide coverage for any other medical condition. Addition
needed to support a claim or appeal regarding eligibility for a
ally, this measure would require plans and insurers to reim
public benefit program. [A. Appr]
burse providers of these services, and prohibit plans that con
AB 1503 (Nation), as amended April 19, 2001, would
tract directly with such providers from delegating risk to them,
unless certain requirements are met. [A. Appr]
require specialized health plans offering professional mental
SB 1219 (Romero, Kuehl) , as amended April 16, 2001,
health services to permit a new enrollee to complete a course
would require health plans and disability insurers to offer
of mental health treatment when the enrollee was involun
coverage for an annual liquid based cervical cancer screen
tarily required to change health plans by his/her employer or
ing test as approved by the FDA. [S. Appr]
sponsor. [A . Health]
AB 207 (Matthews), as amended April 17, 2001, would
AB 532 (Cogdill), as amended April 18, 2001, would
require certain health plans and disability insurers that offer
require the Legislative Analyst to study the operation of health
coverage for prescription drug benefits and that issue identi
plans in rural areas of this state and to report to the legislature
fication cards to enrollees and insureds to issue a card con
and to DMHC on or before July I, 2002, regarding the rea
taining uniform information necessary to process claims for
sons plans have discontinued operati ng in those areas and
prescription drug benefits. [A. Appr]
incentives for plans to resume operating there. [A . Floor]
AB 937 (Koretz) , as introduced February 23, 2001,
would require every health plan covering hospital, medical,
LITIGATION
or surgical expenses to develop and file with DMHC a plan
The federal courts have recently issued a potpourri of opin
establishing risk-adjusted, capitated rates for the reimburse
ions in cases interpreting the impact of the federal Employee
ment of providers for the treatment of enrollees infected with
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) on the liability of
HIV. This bill would also require DMHC to develop risk
managed care plans for the health
adjusted, capitated rates for treatment of Medi-Cal recipients in The federal courts have recently issued a potpourri of care provided by them and the phy
fected with HIV. [A . Health]
opinions in cases interpreting the impact of the federal sicians with whom they contract.
AB 938 (Cohn), as amended Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) on ERISA was originally enacted to
April 19, 2001, would require the liability of managed care plans for the health care protect private-sector employees
health plans to provide to enroll provided by them and the physicians with whom they from fraud by pension plan man
agers, but has been interpreted by
ees, upon request, a list of speci contract.
the federal courts to preempt state
fied contracting health care pro
law and state remedies governing
viders within the enrollee's or
private "employee benefit plans," including employer-subsi
prospective enrollee's general geographic area, including their
dized health care coverage provided through managed care or
medical education, board certification, and subspecialty train
ganizations. In the absence of Congressional action to amend
ing. The bill would also require health plans to permit enroll
ERISA to close this loophole, various states have enacted Jaws
ees to request this information through the plan's toll-free
permitting state court lawsuits under certain circumstances (see
telephone number. AB 938 would also require plans to in
below). While challenges to those state Jaws were pending,
clude on their required disclosure form any limitations on the
California enacted SB 21 (Figueroa) in 1999, which permits
patient's choice of a nonphysician health care provider, and
privately-employed California enrollees to sue their managed
information on general authorization requirements for refer
care organizations under certain circumstances under state law
ral by a primary care physician to a nonphysician health care
in state courts. SB 21 attempts to skirt ERISA by characteriz
practitioner. [A. Appr]
ing managed care as "the business of insurance," to which
SB 117 (Speier), as amended April 3, 2001, would pro
ERISA does not apply.
hibit a health plan from assigning the responsibility for pay
In Pegram v. Herdrich, plaintiff Herdrich-who was
ment of claims for emergency services and care to any con
injured because her HMO required her to wait eight days be
tracting medical provider, unless the contracting provider is
fore undergoing an appendectomy, during which time her
able to demonstrate to DMHC an ability to pay contracting
appendix burst-sued her physician and HMO for medical
and noncontracting providers of emergency services and care
in compliance with the law. [S. Appr]
malpractice under Illinois law and won $35,000. She also sued
AB 1282 (Cardoza), as introduced February 23, 2001,
them under ERISA, claiming that the HMO's bonus system
would prohibit a health plan from excluding an enrollee or
(which provided physicians with incentives to deny, limit, or
46

California Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) ♦ covers November 1999-April 2001

HEALTH CARE REGULATORY AGENCIES
delay treatment) violated their fiduciary duties to their en
ity Act in Corporate Health Insurance Inc. v. Texas Depart
rollees under ERISA. The district court held that the actions
ment of Insurance, 215 F.3d 526 (2000). Enacted in 1997,
of the physician and HMO were not undertaken as ERISA
the Texas statute allows an individual to sue a health insur
ance carrier, HMO, or other managed care entity for dam
fiduciaries; a divided Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the
majority did not hold that the mere existence of incentives
ages proximately caused by the entity's failure to exercise
ordinary care when making a health care treatment decision.
automatically gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty, it stated
that "incentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as
In addition, the law provides that these entities may be held
pleaded here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants
liable for substandard health care treatment decisions made
and plan fiduciaries no longer exists (i.e., where physicians
by their employees, agents, or representatives. When the li
ability provision was challenged by HMOs as being preempted
delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold adminis
tering proper care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose
by ERISA's general preemption clause, the district court found
no preemption and upheld it. [1 7:J CRLR 19-20]
of increasing their bonuses)," and remanded the matter to the
In its June 2000 decision , the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In a
district court to determine whether the defendants had
decision similar to the Third Circuit's ruling in In Re U.S.
breached their fiduciary duty and, if so, whether the breach
Healthcare (see above) , the court found that the Texas statute
caused injuries to Herdrich. [1 7:1 CRLR 18-19]
"does not encompass claims based on a managed care entity's
In its June 12, 2000 decision at 530 U.S. 211 (2000), a
denial of coverage for a medical service recommended by
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court narrowly framed the issue as
"whether treatment decisions made by a health maintenance
the treating physician....Rather, the Act would allow suit for
claims that a treating physician
organization , acting through its
physician employees, are fidu
was negligent in delivering medi
ciary acts within the meaning of The court held that the Texas statute reflects "the cal services , and it imposes vicari
[ERISA] ....We hold that they are regulatory reach of states exercising their traditional ous liability on managed care en
not." After a brief discussion of the police powers in regulating the quality of health care. ti ties for that negligence ." The
history and nature of managed A suit for medical malpractice against a doctor is not court held that the Texas statute
health care, the Court concluded preempted by ERISA simply because those services reflects "the regulatory reach of
that all health plans must limit were arranged for by an HMO and paid for by an ERISA states exercising their traditional
police powers in regulating the
their costs by "rationing care" and plan."
inducing their employee physiquality of health care. A suit for
medical malpractice against a doctor is not preempted by
cians to also ration care. The Court rejected the notion that
ERIS A simply because those services were arranged for by
courts are in the best position to draw a line between accept
an HMO and paid for by an ERISA plan. Likewise, the vi
able and unacceptable incentives. Because profit incentives
carious liability of the entities for whom the doctor acted as
to ration care affect "mixed decisions" (that is, decisions that
an agent is rooted in general principles of state agency law.
bear simultaneously on eligibility decisions of the health plan
Seen in this light, the Act simply codifies Texas's already
and treatment decisions of the physician), acceptance of
plaintiff's fiduciary duty claim would eliminate all for-profit
existing standards regarding medical care. These standards
health plans and possibly all health plans. The Court found
are at the heart of Texas's regulatory power."
The Texas statute also established an independent review
nothing to indicate that Congress intended to eliminate health
process for adverse benefit determinations, and requires an
plans when it enacted ERISA. Even a more limited case-by
insured or enrollee to submit his/her claim for review by an
case approach (such as that suggested by the Seventh Cir
independent review organization (IRO) if such review is re
cuit) would be met in every case with the defense that the
physician acted for good medical reasons, not bad financial
quested by the managed care entity. On this issue, the district
court found ERISA preemption, ruling that the Act's IRO pro
ones, and would therefore simply parallel a medical malprac
tice claim rather than a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.
vision and other provisions "that address specific responsi
bilities of an HMO and further explain and define the proce
The Court found that no purpose would be served in "open
dure for independent review of an adverse benefit determina
ing the federal courthouse doors for a fiduciary malpractice
claim ...."
tion by an IRO" are preempted by ERISA because they "man
On June 19, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a pe
date employee benefit structures or their administration." The
Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. To the ex
tition for a writ of certiorari in In Re U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,
193 F.3d I 5 I ( I 999) , in which the Third Circuit held that
tent that the statute allows independent review of quality of
care claims for which patients may bring suit under the li
while ERISA may preempt state law claims alleging denial
of benefits, it was never intended to exempt HMOs from
ability provision, there is no ERISA preemption. For other
malpractice suits alleging quality of care violations. { 1 7: 1
claims , however, the court held that the statute establishes a
quasi-administrative procedure for the review of a denial of
CRLR 19]
On June 20, 2000, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Ap
benefits and binds the ERISA plan to the decision of the IRO.
peals upheld a significant part of Texas' Health Care Liabil"This scheme creates an alternative mechanism through which
California Regulatory Law Reporter ♦ Volume 17, No. 2 (Winter 2001) ♦ covers November 1999-April 2001

47

HEALTH CARE REGULATORY AGENCIES
------- -- ---- -plan members may seek benefits due them under the terms of
the plan - the identical relief offered under section
1 1 32(a)(l )(B) of ERISA. As such, the independent review
provisions conflict with ERIS A's exclusive remedy" and are
thus preempted.
On October 1 9, 2000 in Moran v. Rush Prudential, 230
F.3d 959 (2000), however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap
peals, by a 5-4 decision, held that a provision of the Illinois
HMO Act requiring health plans to submit to an indepen
dent review when there is disagreement over whether a
course of treatment is medically necessary between a
patient's primary care physician and an HMO is not pre
empted by ERISA.
In this case, Debra Moran's primary care physician rec
ommended a specific surgery for her, but Rush Prudential
(Rush), her ERIS A-govemed health care plan, denied cover
age for that surgery. Instead, Rush offered to pay for a less
expensive surgery performed by a Rush-affiliated doctor. At
her own expense, Moran underwent the $95,000 surgery pro
posed by her physician and later sought reimbursement in
state court under the Illinois HMO Act. The state court even
tually ordered Rush to submit to an independent physician
review; that physician found that the recommended surgery
was medically necessary (although he would have used a less
intrusive and less time-consuming technique). Rush again
denied her claim, and she refiled her action for reimburse
ment in state court. Rush removed the action to federal dis
trict court on ERISA preemption grounds. Rush argued that
Moran's claim for reimbursement was a claim for benefits
that is completely preempted because it falls within section
502(a)( I )(B) of ERIS A's civil enforcement provision. The
district court agreed and granted summary judgment to Rush.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although it found that the
independent review provision falls within the broad scope of
ERISA's preemption clause, it also found that-because it
"regulates insurance," a regulatory power within the control
of the states-the provision is "saved" from preemption by
ERISA's "saving clause." On this point, the Seventh Circuit
parted company with the Fifth Circuit in the Texas case (see
above), thus setting up an inter-circuit split which will un
doubtedly lead to review by the U.S. Supreme Court.
California courts have also issued their fair share of cases
affecting regulation of the managed care industry. In a 4-3
decision in Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, 22 Cal.
4th 1 060 (May 8, 2000), the California Supreme Court held
that, under certain circumstances, a physician is entitled to
the common law right to fair procedure before he may be
removed from an insurer's preferred provider list-and de
spite an at-will termination clause in the underlying contract.
In 1 992, MetLife terminated physician-plaintiff Potvin's
preferred provider status. At first, MetLife declined to give a
reason for the termination. After further requests, Potvin was
told that he did not meet MetLife's standard for malpractice
history. At the time, MetLife would not include or retain on
its preferred provider lists any physician who had more than
48

two malpractice lawsuits, or who had paid an aggregate sum
of $50,000 in judgment or settlement of such actions; Potvin's
patients had sued him four times, resulting in one $713,000
settlement. Potvin sued MetLife for violating his right to fair
procedure and for "devastating his practice" because no other
managed care plans would retain him and physician groups
"dependent on credentialing by MetLife" ceased referring
patients to him. The superior court granted MetLife's motion
for summary judgment but the Second District Court of Ap
peal reversed, holding that MetLife should have given Potvin
notice of the grounds for its action and a reasonable opportu
nity to be heard. [17:1 CRI.R 21; 16:2 CRI.R 13; 16:1 CRl.R 33J
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's rever
sal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment to MetLife,
but disagreed with the appellate court's holding that insurers
and health plans must necessarily comply with the common
law right of fair procedure. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennard stated that "when the right to fair procedure applies,
the decision making must be both substantively rational and
procedurally fair." Here, Kennard found that the right to fair
procedure applies under James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.
2d 721 ( 1 944); Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodon
tists, 1 2 Cal. 3d 541 ( 1 974); and Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal.
3d 267 ( 1 977). In these cases, the decisions of private organi
zations to exclude or expel a member affected the public in
terest because the organization exercised a virtual monopoly
over the supply of labor in that field (a labor union, associa
tions of orthodontists, and a hospital offering a surgical resi
dency program, respectively). As a result, each organization
was subject to the common law right to fair procedure. From
this precedent, Kennard concluded that an insurer wishing to
remove a doctor from its preferred provider list must comply
with the right to fair procedure only "when the insurer pos
sesses power so substantial that the removal significantly im
pairs the ability of an ordinary, competent physician to prac
tice medicine or a medical specialty in a particular geographic
area, thereby affecting an important, substantial economic in
terest." The court found that if participation in a health plan
is a practical necessity for physicians and if removing physi
cians from preferred provider networks that have a virtual
monopoly on managed care significantly impairs those phy
sicians' practice of medicine, then removal must be substan
tially rational and procedurally fair. Finally, the court clari
fied that a "without cause" termination clause in an employ
ment contract is unenforceable if it limits an existing right to
fair procedure under the common law.
The three-member dissent led by Justice Janice Rogers
Brown charged that the majority has, in effect, declared "that
it is the public policy of this state that physicians are entitled
to a minimum income and, therefore, if removal of a physi
cian from an insurer's preferred provider list would reduce
the physician's income below that guaranteed minimum, the
physician is entitled to a hearing and to the judicial review
that would inevitably follow upon an adverse decision. W hat
is the majority's authority for declaring this public policy, for
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singling out physicians for such special treatment?" The dis
ceipt, and which states (in part) that "the obligation of the
sent also opined that the majority's decision is unclear and
plan to comply with this section shall not be deemed to be
unworkable, "in the sense that decisions under it will be un
waived when the plan requires its medical groups, indepen
predictable. As a consequence, insurers will be forced to
dent practice associations, or other contracting entities to pay
forego cost-cutting measures like MetLife's malpractice
claims for covered services." CMA interprets this provision
policy, or be prepared to grant hearings to all physicians ter
to require health plans to pay providers directly when RBOs
do not [17:1 CRLR 20), and argues that the HMOs are in a
minated under such policies." Additionally, insurers will be
unable to predict with confidence whether their decisions will
better position to monitor the financial solvency of RBOs than
invoke the common law right to fair procedure-"in theory,
are individual physicians. The HMOs demurred, arguing that
a physician in Riverside might be entitled to a hearing before
they had already paid FPA via capitation and that no law
being terminated by a given insurer, while a physician in Fre
including section 1371-requires them to pay twice.
mont might not be.... " Finally, the dissent argued that Dr.
In January 2000, the superior court sustained the HM Os'
Potvin had signed a contract with an at-will termination clause,
demurrer on CMA's section 1371 claims without leave to
and that such clause should be enforced.
amend, ruling that section 1371 does not create the duty al
On December 2, 1999, the California Supreme Court is
leged by CMA. In so ruling, the court relied on a December
sued a 4-3 decision in Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 21
29, 1998 DOC decision denying CM A's petition for
Cal. 4th 1066. [17:1 CRLR 20-21 ; 16:2 CRLR 12-13] The
rulemaking. CMA had asked DOC to adopt a regulation mak
majority held that a deceptive practices claim against an HMO
ing plans the primary obligors for payment of claims not
for injunctive relief under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act
withstanding contractual provisions to the contrary. DOC de
clined to adopt such a rule, finding that section 1371 "does
(CLRA), Civil Code section 1 150 et seq., may not be decided
by arbitrators regardless of the existence of a binding arbitra
not create liability for the payment of claims that a plan is
tion clause in the plan's contract, on grounds that "the in
otherwise not responsible for paying" or "override all con
junction plaintiffs seek in the present case is... beyond the
tractual agreements as to liability for payment that providers
arbitrator's power to grant. The CLRA plaintiff in this case is
have entered into with other entities." [16:1 CRLR 29] The
functioning as a private attorney general, enjoining future de
court held that DOC's decision interpreting section 1 371 "is
ceptive practices on behalf of the general public. We hold
entitled to great weight and this court finds the DOC's inter
that under such circumstances arbitration is not a suitable
pretation is supported by the plain language of the statute."
forum, and the Legislature did not intend this type of injunc
CMA has appealed the superior court's decision to the Fourth
tive relief to be arbitrated." However, an injured plaintiff who
District Court of Appeal, where the case is pending at this
writing.
advances a claim for damages under the same statute is bound
by the arbitration clause.
Meanwhile, CMA launched a broader attack on the man
aged care system in federal court. On May 25, 2000, the trade
On December 1, 1999, the California Supreme Court
granted review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal's deci
association filed CMA v. Blue Cross of California, Inc., et
sion in McCall v. Pacijicare of
al., No. CV1894 in U.S. District
�----------,
Court for the Northern District of
California, Inc., 74 Cal . App. 4th ..---- ----25 7 (1999) , on the issue of With varying degrees of success, physicians and the California. In this class action
whether state law claims against medical profession are increasingly turning to the against three major HMOs brought
an HMO arising out of a refusal courts to challenge HMO practices that adversely affect under several state and federal
by the plan to provide services them.
laws (including ERISA and the
under a Medicare-subsidized plan
federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act}, CMA alleges that the
fall within the exclusive review provisions of the Medicare
Act requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. [17:1
health plans have conspired to keep capitation rates low,
fraudulently and intentionally deny or delay payments to phy
CRLR 20] At this writing, the court has not yet issued its
sicians, and improperly interfere with the physician-patient
decision.
relationship. CMA seeks an injunction to halt these practices.
With varying degrees of success, physicians and the
CMA's action coincided with the filing of numerous other
medical profession are increasingly turning to the courts to
federal court class actions by other physician organizations
challenge HMO practices that adversely affect them. In July
claiming to represent every doctor who has signed a contract
1999 in California Medic al Association v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, et al., No. 732614, CMA sued eight HMOs in
with an HMO in the past ten years, and with the filing of
San Diego County Superior Court over their refusal to pay its
about a dozen federal class actions by attorneys representing
physician members for services rendered to patients of HMOs
32 million HMO enrollees across the nation. In July 2000,
contracting with now-bankrupt FPA Medical Management.
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered 1 8 of
these cases consolidated for pretrial purposes before U.S.
In part, CMA alleged that the HMOs violated Health and
Safety Code section 1371, a provision requiring health plans
District Court Judge Federico A. Moreno in the Southern
to pay uncontested claims within 30 working days after reDistrict of Florida. In Re Mana ged Care Litigation, MDL
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No. 1334, has been divided into two cases: "the provider track"
(the cases filed by physicians), and "the subscriber track" (the
cases filed by patients).
On March 2, 2001, Judge Moreno ruled on the defen
dants' motion to dismiss the providers' matter, in which de
fendants relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Pegram v. Herdrich (see above). Judge Moreno chided the
HMOs for reading Pegram "as if it were a talisman before
which all of Plaintiffs' claims should fail. Yet the Court in
Pegram did not fashion an all-encompassing cloak of immu
nity for the health care industry. Instead, partly out of a con
cern that granting the remedy sought by the Plaintiff in Pegram
would result in 'nothing less than elimination of the for-profit
HMO,' ... the Court reached its narrow holding ....Furthermore,
Pegram concerned an ERISA claim brought by a patient with
a significantly different factual situation. The Plaintiffs here
seek relief under a number of state and federal
statutes....Consequently, Pegram does not act as a bar to these
claims."
However, the court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs'
federal prompt payment cause of action, finding that no such
claim exists under federal Medicare laws. Finding that plain
tiffs failed to plead the RICO and state prompt payment claims
properly, the court dismissed those claims with leave to file
an amended complaint. On March 26, 200 l , plaintiffs filed a
new complaint with amended RICO allegations, contending
the HMOs "have undertaken a common scheme to system
atically deny, delay and diminish payments to health care pro
viders" in violation of the federal RICO laws. Plaintiffs al
lege that they have information in their possession that the
insurers have used "cost-based criteria to approve or deny
claims" for payment and had offered cash incentives to claims
reviewers who would deny or limit tests and treatments or
dered by doctors. Plaintiffs further contend that the HMOs
developed the criteria with an actuarial firm and a consulting
firm, and used software that changed standard codes describ
ing treatments to reduce payments.
In the "subscriber track" cases, plaintiffs allege that they
were misled by the HMOs and have paid for more expensive
plans than those they received, in violation of ERISA and
RICO. The subscribers also claim that the defendants make
coverage decisions based on cost rather than on medical ne
cessity, and challenge the HMOs' practice of paying physi
cians bonuses and incentives to deny treatment. The subscrib
ers seek money damages as well as injunctive relief to stop
the defendants from engaging in deceptive practices.
The next phase in these matters will be plaintiffs' mo
tions for class certification. At this writing, a hearing to con
sider certification of the physician class is scheduled for July
2001.
In May 2000, just before the transfer of managed care
regulation to DMHC, DOC filed an accusation (In Re Ka iser
F oundation Health Plan, Inc. (Utterback)), issued a cease
and desist order, and levied a $1 million fine against Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, Inc., the state's largest HMO, stem50

ming from its treatment of 74-year-old Margaret Utterback, a
SO-year member of Kaiser who died in 1996.
According to the accusation, on January 26, 1996, Mrs.
Utterback began experiencing back and abdominal pain dur
ing the early morning, and began telephoning her Kaiser pri
mary care physician at 8:30 a.m. After several calls and re
peated requests to see a physician, Mrs. Utterback was sched
uled for a 4: 15 p.m. appointment. Although she arrived at the
clinic two hours before her scheduled appointed and asked
three times to see a physician, Mrs. Utterback was not seen
until 4:30 p.m. Upon examination, the physician immediately
diagnosed Mrs. Utterback with a dissecting abdominal aortic
aneurysm which- if it ruptures-can cause deadly blood loss.
The physician, however, did not start an IV or administer
oxygen or pain medication; according to DOC, he had his
staff arrange for transport to the emergency room (and failed
to communicate the seriousness of Mrs. Utterback's diagno
sis to the transport vehicle staff). One hour after being diag
nosed, and minutes after arriving at the emergency room, the
aneurysm ruptured; Mrs. Utterback died two days later.
In its accusation, the Department charged Kaiser with
violations of its duties under Health and Safety Code sec
tions 1367(e) (failure to ensure that all medical services are
readily available to all enrollees), 1367(d) (failure to pro
vide continuity of care and ready referral of patients),
1345(b)(5) (failure to provide preventiv e servic es),
l 345(b)(6) (failure to provide emergency services), I367(g)
(failure to have the organizational and administrative ca
pacity to provide services to subscribers and enrollees, in
cluding the maintenance of medical records), and 1368 .0 I
(failure to promptly resolve a grievance). DOC issued an
order requiring Kaiser to cease and desist from (1) failing
to ensure that subscribers and enrollees receive available
and accessible health and medical services rendered in a
manner providing continuity of care; (2) failing to provide
basic health care services, including preventive and emer
gency services; and (3) failing to demonstrate that the plan
has the organizational and administrative capacity to pro
vide services to enrollees, including the maintenance and
ready availability of medical records. Kaiser is appealing
both the enforcement action and the fine.

FUTURE MEETINGS

ACMHC-2001: July 10 in San Francisco, October 10
Glendale,
December 5 in Sacramento. 2002: April 4 in
in
Sacramento, June 19 in Sacramento, September 3 in Los An
geles, November 7 in Los Angeles.
FSSB-2001 : May 22 in Sacramento, June 19 in Glen
dale, July 24 in Sacramento, August 21 in Sacramento, Octo
ber 16 in Glendale, November 13 in Sacramento, December
11 in Glendale. 2002: January 29 in Sacramento, February
28 in Glendale, March 19 in Sacramento, April 23 in Burbank,
June 18 in Burbank, July 30 in Sacramento, December 10 in
Burbank.
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